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WHY RAPE SHOULD BE A FEDERAL CRIME
DONALD A. DRIPPS*
ABSTRACT
Sexual assault remains at high levels despite decades of legal
reforms. The recent wave of accusations against public figures
signals both the persistence of the problem and a new political
climate for addressing it. The Article argues that Congress should
make forcible rape a federal crime, to the limits of the Commerce
Clause. This would bring federal assets to the fight against rape by
redirecting them from enforcement of possessory crimes. The simple
statutory proposal might be accompanied by a more ambitious
reorganization of the Justice Department to include a Bureau of
Violent Crimes. Replies are offered to objections based on federalism,
feminism, civil liberties, and systemic feedback loops.
* Warren Distinguished Professor, University of San Diego Law School. The Article
benefitted greatly from comments received at the Southwest Criminal Law Conference at
UNLV, March 31, 2017, and a workshop at USD on March 24, 2017.
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INTRODUCTION
The year 2017 witnessed an explosion of accusations of sexual
assault and harassment against prominent, even celebrated, leaders
in journalism, entertainment, athletics, business, politics, and law.1
Few of those accused have attempted a defense, and many have lost
their positions, disgraced.2 This extraordinary story, however, gives
as much cause for pessimism as for optimism about reducing
incidents of sexual assault in this country.
The reluctance to come forward until long after the offending
behavior shows that fear and shame had the power to silence. They
still do. Rape remains the most underreported violent crime.3
Perhaps even more revealing than the reluctance to report is the
direction of the reporting. Typically accusers of high-profile men
addressed higher management at work or went to the news media.4
So far as I can tell, none of them started by reporting to the criminal
justice system, despite decades of reforms aimed at encouraging
reporting, protecting victim privacy, and facilitating convictions.5
That makes perfect sense. Police, prosecutors, judges, and juries
still receive sexual assault complaints with special skepticism.6
1. See, e.g., Sarah Almukhtar et al., After Weinstein: 71 Men Accused of Sexual Mis-
conduct and Their Fall from Power, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 8, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/
interactive/2017/11/10/us/men-accused-sexual-misconduct-weinstein.html [https://perma.cc/
VWX5-7LYY].
2. See id.
3. See W. David Allen, The Reporting and Underreporting of Rape, 73 S. ECON. J. 623,
623 (2007); see also Catharine A. MacKinnon, Rape Redefined, 10 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 431,
439 (2016) (“One out of about ten acts of rape or attempted rape that fit basic legal definitions
in the United States is reported to authorities.”); infra Part I.B.1. 
4. See, e.g., Tracy Jan, Hollywood Manager Who Worked with Halle Berry, Taraji P.
Henson Closes Agency After Accusations of Sexual Harassment, WASH. POST (Feb. 5, 2018),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/hollywood-manager-who-worked-with-
halle-berry-taraji-p-henson-will-close-agency-after-accusations-of-sexual-harassment/
2018/02/05/557debd0-0ab8-11e8-8b0d-891602206fb7_story.html?utm_term=.72f56d259d82
[https://perma.cc/C82N-8L86]; April Simpson, NPR’s Daniel Zwerdling Out After Investigation
into Harassment, CURRENT (Feb. 6, 2018), https://current.org/2018/02/nprs-daniel-zwerdling-
out-after-investigation-into-harassment/ [https://perma.cc/P2RT-KE6L].
5. See sources cited supra note 4; infra notes 94-100 and accompanying text.
6. See MacKinnon, supra note 3, at 439 (“Dramatically fewer [cases than reported] are
prosecuted or result in convictions or incarceration, a process termed rape attrition.”). 
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If recent accusations really mark the beginning of widespread
willingness to report, the legal system is not prepared for it. If the
real reporting rate is 10 percent now, bringing it up to 20 percent
would mark significant but marginal progress on reporting. It would
also double the demand for resources committed to sexual assault
cases, from the police investigation all the way through to correc-
tions.
A new climate of public opinion condemns sexual predation like
never before.7 Therein lies an important opportunity for reform.
Political leaders have fresh incentives to give serious consideration
to new policy proposals that offer some hope of improving the legal
system’s response to sexual assault.8
This Article argues that Congress should make forcible rape a
federal crime to the limits of the Commerce Clause.9 Premised on
proof of a nexus with interstate commerce, the Hobbs Act makes
robbery a federal crime,10 the Federal Kidnapping Act makes kid-
napping a federal crime,11 and the federal carjacking statute creates
a federal crime of forcible theft of vehicles.12 In addition, Congress
took action against forced participation in commercial sex by mak-
ing human trafficking “in or affecting interstate or foreign com-
merce” a federal crime.13
The Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Morrison struck
down the civil cause of action authorized by the Violence Against
Women Act of 1994.14 The Act, however, did not require case-specific
proof of a commerce nexus.15 This Article proposes a new offense
that is modeled on federal criminal statutes that include such
jurisdictional elements.16 The federal courts have heard thousands
7. See, e.g., Christine Filer, 6 in 10 Have Hope for Lasting Change on Sexual Harassment
(POLL), ABC NEWS (Jan. 24, 2018, 7:00 AM), https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/ten-hope-lasting-
change-sexual-harassment/story?id=52550296 [https://perma.cc/KYN3-VG66].
8. Cf. id. (noting that the growth in condemnation crosses party lines).
9. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
10. 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (2012).
11. Id. § 1201(a).
12. Id. § 2119.
13. Id. § 1591(a)(1).
14. 529 U.S. 598, 601-02 (2000).
15. Id. at 613.
16. See, e.g., supra notes 10-13 and accompanying text.
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of these federal prosecutions for robbery, carjacking, kidnapping,
and human trafficking since Morrison.17
How many rapes the commerce power might reach is uncertain.
Clearly, the commerce power does not reach all sexual assaults.18
However, it could reach a very significant number.19 Some rape vic-
tims are themselves interstate or foreign travelers.20 Many rapes in-
volve use of the “channels” or “instrumentalities” of commerce, such
as the Internet or motel rooms.21 Many rapes occur at the work-
place, and are already subject to federal regulation under Title VII.22
Many others victimize workers in the commercial sex market.23
Wherever the courts mark the limit of the commerce power,
Congress clearly has constitutional power to make rape a federal
crime to the limits of that power, just as with gun possession by
felons, robbery, and human trafficking.24 What good might come of
this?
First, deeply embedded social attitudes—“rape myths”—have
made enforcement of even traditionally defined forcible rape of-
fenses difficult. Police, prosecutors, and judges embrace these myths
only a little less widely than citizens called for jury duty.25 Effec-
tively enforcing even the narrow definition of rape as penetration by
forcible compulsion requires a legal, and thus social, battle of
attrition.26 Victory will be measured not by convictions, but by a
17. During Fiscal Year 2014 alone, federal prosecutors initiated over 939 federal robbery
cases, 122 kidnapping cases, and 18 cases of motor vehicle theft in district courts. See MARK
MOTIVANS, U.S. DEP’T JUST., FEDERAL JUSTICE STATISTICS, 2014—STATISTICAL TABLES 16
tbl.4.1 (2017), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/fjs14st.pdf [https://perma.cc/S32A-3M 7G].
During that same year, 423 sex trafficking suspects were referred to and prosecuted by U.S.
attorneys. See MARK MOTIVANS & HOWARD N. SNYDER, U.S. DEP’T JUST., FEDERAL PROS-
ECUTION OF HUMAN-TRAFFICKING CASES, 2015, at 4 tbl.1 (2018), https://www.bjs.gov/
content/pub/pdf/fphtc15.pdf [https://perma.cc/AE95-EKF7].
18. See infra Part II.C.
19. See infra Part II.B.
20. See infra notes 301-04 and accompanying text.
21. See infra Parts II.B.1-2.
22. See infra Part II.B.4.a.
23. See infra Part II.B.4.b.
24. See supra notes 10-13 and accompanying text; see also infra Part II.B.
25. See Meagen M. Hildebrand & Cynthia J. Najdowski, The Potential Impact of Rape
Culture on Juror Decision Making: Implications for Wrongful Acquittals in Sexual Assault
Trials, 78 ALB. L. REV. 1059, 1064 (2015).
26. See MacKinnon, supra note 3, at 439 (“[M]aybe one reason rape law is so ineffective
is its failure to define the legal reality in terms of the social reality.”).
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change in social norms.27 In that battle, more righteous prosecutions
may be lost than won. Only the federal sovereign has the resources
to fight that battle.28
Second, mass incarceration, with a dramatic racially disparate
impact, is indeed a cause of national concern.29 Those who see pos-
sessory offenses far removed from actual violence as problematic
generally see federal criminal law as the paradigmatic example of
what is wrong with the overall system.30 If federal rape prosecutions
were simply superimposed on the existing system, and independ-
ently financed, all the good that one might hope for would be finally
putting enough force into the fight against rape to make some prog-
ress.31 The woes of mass incarceration would be aggravated.32 In the
real world, however, a new commitment, especially if invested in a
new bureau with powerful supporters elsewhere in the government,
27. See NAT’L SEXUAL VIOLENCE RES. CTR., ENGAGING BYSTANDERS TO PREVENT SEXUAL
VIOLENCE: A GUIDE FOR PREVENTIONISTS 1, 4 (2013) (“A change in social norms that promotes
healthy, respectful relationships in place of actions and behaviors that support rape culture
is needed to prevent sexual violence.”), http://www.nsvrc.org/sites/default/files/publications_
nsvrc_guide_engaging-bystanders-prevent-sexual-violence_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/SVJ4-LD
UK].
28. See infra Part III.A.1.
29. See, e.g., Barack Obama, The President’s Role in Advancing Criminal Justice Reform,
130 HARV. L. REV. 811, 815 (2017) (“We simply cannot afford to spend $80 billion annually on
incarceration, to write off the seventy million Americans—that’s almost one in three
adults—with some form of criminal record, to release 600,000 inmates each year without a
better program to reintegrate them into society, or to ignore the humanity of 2.2 million men
and women currently in U.S. jails and prisons and over 11 million men and women moving
in and out of U.S. jails every year.” (footnotes omitted)).
30. See, e.g., Michael Tonry, Federal Sentencing “Reform” Since 1984: The Awful as Enemy
of the Good, CRIME & JUST., Sept. 2015, at 99, 99 (“After the federal guidelines took effect,
buttressed by a plethora of mandatory minimum sentence laws, the growth of the federal
prison population far outpaced that of the states, and the federal system became the extreme
example nationally and internationally of the dangers of politicization of crime policy.”).
31. See infra Part III.A.1.
32. See German Lopez, The Justice System Needs to Take Rape More Seriously. That
Doesn’t Mean Longer Prison Sentences, VOX (Sept. 2, 2016, 10:10 AM), https://www.vox.com/
2016/9//1/12652758/rape-prison-mass-incarceration [https://perma.cc/UBF6-32NP] (noting the
“real concern” that mandating or increasing prison sentences in sexual assault cases conflicts
with the policy of reducing mass incarceration). Following the Brock Turner case, the
California legislature prohibited suspended sentences for offenders convicted of sexual assault
on unconscious victims. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1203.065 (West 2019). By contrast, federal law
does not now provide a mandatory minimum term for sexual assault. This Article argues for
extending federal rape law under the Commerce Clause, not for mandatory minimum
sentences.
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could not help but draw resources away from drug and firearms
cases.33
Federal agents, prosecutors, magistrates, and judges are rightly
seen as something of an elite.34 Federal sentences are generally
more severe than their state counterparts.35 Certain federal
procedures give some tactical advantages to prosecutors in rape
cases.36 The dual-sovereign doctrine, which defines conduct
offending both state and federal law as two distinct offenses under
the Double Jeopardy Clause, would enable limited reconsideration
of egregiously irrational acquittals.37 In real-world rape cases,
federal heat has realistic prospects of finally turning the tide.
Part I documents the continued high rate of sexual assault and
low rates of reporting, clearance, and conviction. Part II assesses the
commerce power’s reach over many, but far from all, sexual as-
saults. Part III makes the case that a federal law against rape
would improve rape enforcement and federal criminal justice gen-
erally. Part IV addresses foreseeable objections premised on fed-
eralism, feminism, procedural fairness, and systemic feedback loops.
Appendix I offers model language for a federal law against rape,
modeled on the Hobbs Act and the existing federal sexual assault
laws applicable to the government’s maritime and territorial
jurisdiction. Appendix II provides model language for the creation
of a Bureau of Violent Crimes that would take its place alongside
the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Drug Enforcement
Administration (DEA), and Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms
and Explosives (ATF) in the Justice Department (DOJ). A separate
bureau would not only enforce the new federal rape statute, but
other federal laws against violent crime. The two proposals are
related but distinct. A federal rape law is doubly justified by the
33. See infra Part III.B.
34. See, e.g., Benjamin Weiser, A Steppingstone for Law’s Best and Brightest, N.Y. TIMES
(Jan. 29, 2009), https://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/30/nyregion/30southern.html [https://
perma.cc/D6NT-4QM7] (describing the prestige of being a U.S. Attorney in the Southern
District of New York).
35. See Ronald F. Wright, Federal or State? Sorting as a Sentencing Choice, A.B.A. SEC.
CRIM. JUST., Summer 2006, at 16, 17.
36. See infra Part III.A.2.
37. See United States v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 377, 382 (1922) (holding that the state and
federal government may both try and punish a defendant for the same crime); infra notes 366-
67 and accompanying text.
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need for more effective enforcement and by the advantages of
reorienting federal criminal law away from contraband offenses and
toward violent crimes. A new enforcement agency would both give
teeth to the new rape statute and mark a more general turn toward
crimes of violence.
I. STATE ENFORCEMENT ALONE HAS MADE LITTLE PROGRESS
AGAINST RAPE
Criminal law aims to condemn past offenses and prevent future
ones.38 To convict the guilty, the system needs a reported rape, an
arrest by police, a charging decision by prosecutors, and either a
guilty plea or a conviction by a jury. If enough offenses are thus
punished and denounced, it is plausible to believe that the fre-
quency of the crime will decline.39 How well have the states been
doing the job?
A. Extent and Trend of Victimization
The FBI’s Uniform Crime Reports (UCR) provide data on the
frequency of crimes reported to law enforcement and the frequency
of arrests.40 Until 2013, the UCR system recorded reports of rape
defined as vaginal penetration by force without consent.41 In 2013,
38. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A)-(B) (2012) (mentioning these goals, among others,
as factors for federal judges to consider in the imposition of a sentence).
39. See Michael Tonry, Learning from the Limitations of Deterrence Research, 37 CRIME
& JUST. 279, 279-80 (2008) (“The state of the art of policy-relevant knowledge about the
deterrent effects of the criminal justice system is little different in 2008 than it was 30 years
ago when the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) panel on deterrence and incapacitation
reported that the existence of a criminal justice system has overall deterrent effects, there is
a widely shared intuition that penalty increases have marginal deterrent effects but the
available evidence is highly ambiguous and contested.... There is some evidence, as Beccaria
and Bentham believed, that certainty and promptness of punishment are more important
than severity. Because there are differences in order of magnitude in the abilities of police and
courts to alter the promptness of their behavior or affect would-be offenders’ perceptions of
risk, changes in police practices are more likely to achieve deterrent effects than changes in
sentencing policies and practices.”).
40. See Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) Program, FED. BUREAU INVESTIGATION, https://
www.fbi.gov/services/cjis/ucr [https://perma.cc/CRM6-6DQH].
41. See Press Release, Fed. Bureau of Investigation, FBI Releases 2013 Crime Statistics
1 (Nov. 10, 2014), https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/2013/crime-in-the-u.s.-2013/summary-
2013/ 2013-cius-summary-_final.pdf [https://perma.cc/CBN4-PCVU].
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the FBI redefined rape to include all forms of sexual penetration
without consent.42 This new definition includes oral and anal pen-
etration and drops the force requirement.43 In the years since, the
UCR gives statistics for both the “revised definition” (penetration
without consent) and the “legacy definition” (vaginal penetration by
force without consent).44
From 1996 to 2015, the reported rate of forcible rape declined
from 36.3 to 28.1 per 100,000 inhabitants.45 However, the reported
number of 90,185 forcible rapes in 2015 is still disturbing.46 Because
rape is generally and substantially underreported,47 it is at least as
likely that the decline in reports reflects a worsening, rather than
an improving situation.48 The reporting number sheds some light on
law enforcement’s response to reports, but little if any on the
frequency of rape.
The Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS) annually conducts the
National Crime Victimization Survey (NCVS).49 The 2015 survey
found that incidence of rape victimization climbed from 1.1 per one
thousand persons in 2014 to 1.6 per one thousand persons in
201550—more than five times as high as the UCR rate.51 The revised
2016 NCVS reported a victimization rate for rape or sexual assault
of 1.1 per one thousand persons.52
42. See id.
43. See id.
44. See Table 1: Crime in the United States by Volume and Rate Per 100,000 Inhabitants,
1996-2015, FED. BUREAU INVESTIGATION [hereinafter FBI Data, 1996-2015], https://ucr.fbi.
gov/crime-in-the-u.s/2015/crime-in-the-u.s.-2015/tables/table-1 [https://perma.cc/Y2TN-JEQQ];
see also supra notes 41-43 and accompanying text.
45. See FBI Data, 1996-2015, supra note 44.
46. See id.
47. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
48. Cf. David A. Fahrenthold, Statistics Show Drop in U.S. Rape Cases, WASH. POST (June
19, 2006), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/06/18/AR2006061800
610.html [https://perma.cc/VY7P-8LUH] (noting that the drop in reported rapes could be a
“statistical mirage”).
49. See, e.g., JENNIFER L. TRUMAN & RACHEL E. MORGAN, BUREAU JUST. STATS., CRIMINAL
VICTIMIZATION, 2015 (rev. ed. 2018), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cv15.pdf [https://
perma.cc/X8BM-CKKY].
50. See id. at 2 tbl.1.
51. See FBI Data, 1996-2015, supra note 44.
52. RACHEL E. MORGAN & GRACE KENA, BUREAU JUST. STATS., CRIMINAL VICTIMIZATION,
2016: REVISED, at 2 tbl. 1 (2018), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cv16.pdf [https://perma.
cc/33RY-V5BU]. 
2019] WHY RAPE SHOULD BE A FEDERAL CRIME 1695
The 2016 NCVS surveyed a different set of counties than previous
surveys, so any inference of a trend from 2015 to 2016 would be
dubious.53 According to the survey, there was “no statistically sig-
nificant change in the rate of overall violent crime ... [or] the rate of
serious violence” between 2015 and 2016.54 The 1.1 per one thou-
sand persons incidence rate is close to the rate reported in the 2000
NCVS.55
The NCVS, a very valuable source of data on crime in general,
substantially undercounts the actual incidence of rape.56 The BJS
recognized this and commissioned a National Research Council
(NRC) report.57 The NRC panel found the NCVS flawed in four
ways: (1) “a sample design that is inefficient for measuring these
low-incidence events,” (2) “the context of ‘crime’ that defines the
survey,” (3) “a lack of privacy for respondents in completing the
survey,” and (4) “the use of words with ambiguous meaning for key
measures in the questionnaire.”58 For example, respondents may not
recognize their victimization as “crime” or “rape.”59 Further, the
same motives for not reporting to the police may influence responses
to an official survey.60 Because the NCVS questions households
rather than individuals, respondents may withhold information they
do not want other family members to know.61
53. See id. at 3 (noting that many of the interviewees in the 2016 survey were “from a
somewhat different set of U.S. counties and had a somewhat different composition of
demographic characteristics than under the prior sample design”). While the NCVS sought
to resolve some data comparability problems with its revised data file, some limitations
remain. See id. at 4.
54. Id. at 2.
55. See CALLIE MARIE RENNISON, BUREAU JUST. STATS., CRIMINAL VICTIMIZATION 2000:
CHANGES 1999-2000 WITH TRENDS 1993-2000, at 3 tbl.1 (2001), https://www.bjs.gov/content/
pub/pdf/cv00.pdf [https://perma.cc/W3CE-VTTP].
56. See, e.g., Kimberly A. Lonsway & Joanne Archambault, The “Justice Gap” for Sexual
Assault Cases: Future Directions for Research and Reform, 18 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 145,
146-47 (2012) (summarizing weaknesses in NCVS methodology).
57. See generally CANDACE KRUTTSCHNITT ET AL., NAT’L RES. COUNCIL, ESTIMATING THE
INCIDENCE OF RAPE AND SEXUAL ASSAULT (2014).
58. Id. at 155. 
59. See id. at 157 (“[V]ictims may not always think of a rape or sexual assault as a crime,
particularly if the respondent knows the offender.”).
60. See id. (“[S]ome victims may fear disclosure to police and may associate a government
crime survey too closely with law enforcement.”).
61. See id. (“Privacy, specifically from other household members, is critical for accurately
responding to inquiries about rape and sexual assault, in part because the victim often knows
the offender. In fact, the offender may be a household member.”).
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The NRC panel concluded “it is highly likely that the NCVS is
underestimating rape and sexual assault.”62 The panel did not offer
an estimate of the size of the undercount, but comparisons with
other surveys suggest a vast number of incidents are not picked up
by the NCVS.63 For example, the Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention (CDC) 1994 National Violence Against Women survey
found more than twice as many estimated rapes as the correspond-
ing NCVS.64
The CDC’s 2011 National Intimate Partner and Sexual Violence
Survey (NISVS) found that “an estimated 1.6 [percent] of women
reported that they were raped in the 12 months preceding the
survey.”65 That year, the NCVS found a rape victimization rate of
0.9 per one thousand persons of both genders.66 Halving the CDC’s
number to correspond, roughly, to the population base in the NCVS,
the CDC survey found 8 rape victims per one thousand people—far
higher than the NCVS rate of 0.9 per one thousand people.67
The NCVS data suggests a long-term decline in the victimization
rate.68 Even if the NCVS undercounts, changes across time might
still reflect overall trends. The 1995 NCVS found the incidence of
“rape/sexual assault” to be 1.6 per one thousand people.69 By 2014,
62. Id. at 106.
63. See id. tbl.6-5 (reporting estimates of numbers of rapes and attempted rapes from
various sources). 
64. See PATRICIA TJADEN & NANCY THOENNES, FULL REPORT OF THE PREVALENCE,
INCIDENCE, AND CONSEQUENCES OF VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 15 (2000) (“NVAW Survey
estimates of the number of rapes perpetrated against women and men annually (876,064 and
111,298, respectively) are higher than comparable estimates from the ... BJS ... NCVS. The
NCVS estimates for 1994—a year that approximates the timeframe for the NVAW
Survey—are 432,100 rapes or sexual assaults of U.S. females age 12 and older and 32,900
rapes or sexual assaults of U.S. males age 12 and older.”). 
65. Matthew J. Breiding et al., Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, Prevalence and
Characteristics of Sexual Violence, Stalking, and Intimate Partner Violence Victimization—
National Intimate Partner and Sexual Violence Survey, United States, 2011, MORBIDITY &
MORTALITY WKLY. REP. SURVEILLANCE SUMMARIES, Sept. 5, 2014, at 1, 1, https://www.cdc.gov/
mmwr/pdf/ss/ss6308.pdf [https://perma. cc/YV2C-ETEP].
66. JENNIFER L. TRUMAN & MICHAEL PLANTY, BUREAU JUST. STATS., CRIMINAL VICTIM-
IZATION, 2011, at 3 tbl.2 (2012), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cv11.pdf [https://perma.cc/
CLA5-CVRZ]. 
67. Compare Breiding et al., supra note 65, at 1, with TRUMAN & PLANTY, supra note 66,
at 3 tbl.2.
68. See infra Figure 1.
69. BUREAU JUST. STATS., CRIMINAL VICTIMIZATION IN THE UNITED STATES, 1995, at 8 tbl.1
(2000), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cvus95.pdf [https://perma.cc/XXB3-9Y5H].
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that number declined to 1.1 per one thousand people.70 The 2015
survey found the rate to have climbed to 1.6 per one thousand
people—just where it stood in 1995.71 The authors cautioned that:
While the change in the rape or sexual assault rate from 2014 to
2015 is significantly different at the 90 [percent] confidence
level, care should be taken in interpreting this change because
the estimates of rape or sexual assault are based on a small
number of cases reported to the survey.72
That caveat, however, applies to all editions of the NCVS.73
Rape-related emergency room (ER) visits offer another metric for
measuring the trend of rape frequency. Victims who go or are taken
to emergency rooms have strong medical reasons to seek treatment
and can obtain medical care without talking to the police. The CDC
monitors ER visits due to sexual assault.74 In 2001, the earliest data
point, the CDC found the age-adjusted rate of sexual assault for the
female population to be 42.99 per 100,000 people.75 That figure was
46.35 in 2005, 43.43 in 2010, and 43.13 in 2014.76 Unless incidence
went down and was precisely offset by increasing willingness to go
to the ER,77 these ER numbers suggest that the frequency of forcible
rape has not significantly changed in fifteen years.
Some data suggests that survivors with injuries are both more
willing to seek medical care and more likely to seek that care at a
70. See TRUMAN & MORGAN, supra note 49, at 2 tbl.1. 
71. Compare id., with BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, supra note 69, at 8 tbl.1.
72. See TRUMAN & MORGAN, supra note 49, at 16. 
73. See id. (“[S]mall absolute changes and fluctuations in the rates of victimization can
result in larger year-to-year change estimates.”).
74. See Sexual Violence: Data Sources, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION,
https://www.cdc.gov/violenceprevention/sexualviolence/datasources.html [https://perma.cc/
Z2DE-WDBZ] (listing the National Electronic Injury Surveillance System-All Injury Program,
which provides data on injuries treated at ERs, as a data source).
75. See Nonfatal Injury Reports, 2000-2016, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION,
https://webappa.cdc.gov/sasweb/ncipc/nfirates.html [https://perma.cc/XL53-JNX6] (select
“Assault-Sexual” in question 1; then click the “Sex” menu and select “Females” in question
3; then select “2001” in each of the two menus under “Year(s) of Report” in question 3; then
click “Submit Request”).
76. See id. (follow the same method outlined in note 75, supra, but selecting either “2005,”
“2010,” or “2014” instead of “2001” in both of the menus under “Year(s) of Report” in question
3).
77. Cf. supra notes 47-48 and accompanying text.
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medical clinic. The NCVS data shows the percentage of injured rape
victims who sought medical care rose from 26 percent in the years
1994-1998 to 35 percent in the years 2005-2010.78 The same data
shows the percentage of injured victims receiving medical care at
hospitals, ERs, or doctor’s offices, as opposed to at the scene of the
rape or elsewhere, rose from 65 percent to 80 percent.79
Figure 1 shows annual incidence according to the UCR legacy
definition data from 1995 through 2017,80 the CDC ER data from
2001 through 2017,81 and the NCVS data from 1995 through 2017.82
For consistency with the UCR and NCVS data, I use the CDC rate
per total crude population, not the female population.83 I also in-
clude the FBI’s UCR rate per 100,000 of murder and non-negligent
manslaughter in the UCR-H line.84 The homicide data enable com-
parison between the various measures of rape frequency and the
rate of another serious violent crime that is not subject to compa-
rable reporting problems.85
78. See MICHAEL PLANTY ET AL., BUREAU JUST. STATS., FEMALE VICTIMS OF SEXUAL
VIOLENCE, 1994-2010, at 6 tbl.6 (rev. ed. 2016), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/
fvsv9410.pdf [https://perma.cc/22JY-FZP7].
79. Id. 
80. See Table 1: Crime in the United States by Volume and Rate Per 100,000 Inhabitants,
1997-2016, FED. BUREAU INVESTIGATION [hereinafter FBI Data, 1997-2016], https://ucr.fbi.
gov/crime-in-the-u.s/2016/crime-in-the-u.s.-2016/topic-pages/tables/table-1 [https://perma.cc/
9JHN-BUJ2]; Table 1: Crime in the United States by Volume and Rate Per 100,000 Inhab-
itants, 1995-2014, FED. BUREAU INVESTIGATION [hereinafter FBI Data, 1995-2014], https://ucr.
fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/2014/crime-in-the-u.s.-2014/tables/table-1 [https://perma.cc/V8FF-
TK8S].
81. See Nonfatal Injury Reports, 2000-2016, supra note 75 (select “Assault-Sexual” in
question 1; then click the “Sex” menu and select “Both Sexes” in question 3; then select “2001”
in each of the two menus under “Year(s) of Report” in question 3; then click “Submit Request.”
Repeat this method for each year from 2001 to 2015).
82. See Publications & Products: Criminal Victimization, BUREAU JUST. STATS., https://
www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=pbse&sid=6 [https://perma.cc/PF2W-2WPF] (click on each of the
Criminal Victimization reports from 1995 to 2016, and locate the victimization rate per one
thousand persons age 12 or older and the “Rape/sexual assault” column in each report).
83. See supra note 81 (including “Both Sexes” in the dataset).
84. See FBI Data, 1997-2016, supra note 80; FBI Data, 1995-2014, supra note 80.
85. Cf. supra notes 3, 47-48 and accompanying text.
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Figure 1
The swings in the NCVS data seem more likely to reflect method-
ological issues than any genuine change in the incidence rate.86 The
ER data are quite steady, showing, if any change, a slight increase
after 2009.87 In the UCR data, the rape trend resembles the
homicide trend, showing a slight decline from the late 1990s
through 2014 and a recent slight uptick.88 If law enforcement’s
initiatives against rape were achieving real progress, we would
expect to see an increase in reporting to police, a decline in victim-
ization survey reports, and a decrease in ER visits.
All three measures of rape frequency underestimate the true
number of offenses.89 The 2011 NISVS finding of 1.6 percent of
women victimized annually,90 halved to roughly approximate the
total population base in the Figure 1 measures is 800 per 100,000.
The vertical axis in Figure 1 would have to be more than four times
higher to even fit that data point on the chart. 
86. See, e.g., MORGAN & KENA, supra note 52, at 3-4.
87. See supra Figure 1.
88. See supra Figure 1.
89. See supra notes 3, 47-48, 56-62 and accompanying text.
90. See Breiding et al., supra note 65, at 5 tbl.1.
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However one parses the statistics, the situation is grim. The CDC
NISVS found a 19.3 percent lifetime prevalence rate of rape among
adult women.91 Not only does the U.S. rape epidemic persist, but the
legal system’s response to rape is, if anything, getting worse rather
than better over time.92
B. Reporting, Complaint Processing, Prosecutions, and
Convictions
States have shown the political will to attack the rape problem.93
Spurred by the feminist movement, legislatures began adopting
major reforms in the 1970s.94 These included rape shield laws and
the abolition of archaic common-law rules such as the resistance re-
quirement and limiting the offense to vaginal penetration.95 This
period also saw the emergence of new institutions, as activists es-
tablished rape crisis centers and law enforcement agencies created
specialized sexual assault units.96
Frustrated by the persistence of underreporting and low con-
viction rates, legislatures prescribed some very strong medicine,
including sex offender registries,97 civil commitment even of the
91. See id. at 4. 
92. See infra Part I.B.
93. See infra Part I.C.
94. See Ilene Seidman & Susan Vickers, The Second Wave: An Agenda for the Next Thirty
Years of Rape Law Reform, 38 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 467, 469-71 (2005).
95. See, e.g., id. at 469-70, 469 n.14 (“In the wake of demands for equal rights for women
under the law and tighter criminal justice controls during the 1970s, reform of rape laws
became a legislative priority. As a result, over the next thirty years, every state in the country
and the District of Columbia redrafted their rape statutes in some way. Though the reforms
were not identical, they each focused almost exclusively on the victim’s role within the
criminal justice system. These criminal justice reforms fell into four categories: (1)
redefinition of the offense (repealing spousal exemptions and abolishing specific gender roles
for the accuser and accused); (2) evidentiary reforms (elimination of corroboration
requirements, enactment of rape shield statutes); (3) reforms in statutory age requirements;
and (4) reforms in statutory structures (grading of offenses according to severity of force and
resulting injuries).” (footnotes omitted)).
96. See, e.g., Suzanne Charlé, Sex Crimes Units Are Raising Conviction Rates,
Consciousness, Costs ... and Questions, POLICE MAG., Mar. 1980, at 52, 53-56 (describing
experience with special police units dedicated to sexual assault cases); History of the
Movement, WASH. COALITION SEXUAL ASSAULT PROGRAMS, https://www.wcsap.org/advocacy/
program-management/new-directors/history/history-movement [https://perma.cc/GA72-DK
RX].
97. See, e.g., Wayne A. Logan, Sex Offender Registration and Community Notification:
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criminally responsible,98 and admissibility of past bad acts to show
propensity.99 Legislatures skirted the line of unconstitutionality
and sometimes crossed it.100 The results have fallen far short of the
proponents’ hopes.
1. Rape Remains Significantly Underreported
The analysis in Part I.A suggests that the incidence of rape prob-
ably has changed little, if at all, in the last twenty years.101 Accord-
ing to the FBI, reporting during this period actually declined, from
36.3 rapes per 100,000 people per year in 1996 to 28.1 in 2015.102
That would represent an increase in reporting only if the incidence
of rape fell by more than 25 percent.103 It seems considerably more
Past, Present, and Future, 34 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 3, 5 (2008) (“In 1990,
Washington State enacted the nation’s first registration and community notification law,
permitting dissemination of identifying information on registrants to communities in which
registrants lived. In 1994, New Jersey’s rapid adoption of registration and notification, in the
wake of Megan Kanka’s sexual abuse and murder by a convicted sex offender living nearby,
fueled national interest in the social control strategies. The laws quickly swept the nation,
with legislatures often adopting in verbatim form one another’s legislative findings.”); see also
id. at 5-6 (explaining that Congress conditioned federal funds on state adoption of registration
and notification laws).
98. See, e.g., Deirdre M. Smith, Dangerous Diagnoses, Risky Assumptions, and the Failed
Experiment of “Sexually Violent Predator” Commitment, 67 OKLA. L. REV. 619, 621 (2015) (“In
1990 ... the Washington legislature enacted a statute allowing the state to continue to detain
certain sex offenders after they had completed their criminal sentences. The targets of these
new laws were dubbed ‘Sexually Violent Predators’ (SVPs), a label intended to connote a
subclass of sex offenders who run a high risk of recidivism after their release due to the
presence of a mental abnormality or personality disorder. Soon thereafter, a few other states,
including Kansas, enacted their own commitment laws modeled closely after Washington’s.”
(footnotes omitted)).
99. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 413-14; Tamara Rice Lave & Aviva Orenstein, Empirical
Fallacies of Evidence Law: A Critical Look at the Admission of Prior Sex Crimes, 81 U. CIN.
L. REV. 795, 800-01 (2013) (“Since 1995, twelve states ... have adopted statutes similar to
Rules 413 and 414 [of the Federal Rules of Evidence].”). 
100. See Olden v. Kentucky, 488 U.S. 227, 233 (1988) (per curiam) (striking down the
application of state rape shield law to exclude proof of a sexual relationship relevant to show
accuser’s motive to fabricate); Rice Lave & Orenstein, supra note 99, at 801 (“Five
states—Delaware, Indiana, Iowa, Missouri and Washington—passed ... legislation [admitting
prior crimes evidence for propensity], but their Supreme Courts rejected the rules as
unconstitutional.”). 
101. See supra Part I.A.
102. See FBI Data, 1996-2015, supra note 44.
103. Cf. id.
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plausible to see the reporting trend as underreporting getting worse,
rather than the frequency of the crime getting better.
The NCVS asks whether victims reported to the police.104 The
self-reported reporting rate for rape victims in the NCVS has fluc-
tuated wildly. Between 1995 and 1999, the reporting rate varied
only a point or two from 30 percent.105 Then in 2000, the rate went
up to 48.1 percent.106 It remained near 50 percent until 2011, when
it fell to 27 percent.107 The BJS did not explain the sudden drop in
the reporting rate, which has remained around the 30 percent rate
that prevailed in the late 1990s.108 In 2015, the rate fell from 33.6
percent to 32.5 percent.109 The self-reported reporting rate in the
2016 NCVS was 23.2 percent,110 with no indication whether con-
tinuing counties showed a sharp decline or whether the decline was
due to lower reporting rates in the newly included counties.111
Evidence from other surveys also shows that “the likelihood of
reporting a sexual assault increased from the 1960s to the 1990s
but has remained stable since that time.”112 While other surveys
are consistent with the NCVS on the reporting rate trend, they find
that rate substantially lower than the rate found by the NCVS.113
The most recent studies also suggest that a large majority of
rapes go unreported. The BJS analyzed the NCVS data from college-
age women collected from 1995 to 2013, and found that only 20
percent of students and 32 percent of nonstudents reported the
crime to police.114 The Association of American Universities (AAU)
104. See TRUMAN & MORGAN, supra note 49, at 14.
105. See RENNISON, supra note 55, at 10 tbl.7.
106. Id.
107. See TRUMAN & PLANTY, supra note 66, at 8 tbl.8. 
108. See, e.g., TRUMAN & MORGAN, supra note 49, at 6 tbl.4 (showing percentages for 2014
and 2015 at 33.6 percent and 32.5 percent, respectively).
109. Id.
110. MORGAN & KENA, supra note 52, at 7 tbl.4.
111. For more information on the redesign of county samples, see id. at 3-4.
112. Lonsway & Archambault, supra note 56, at 147. 
113. See id. at 147-48 (“However, estimates for the reporting rate are considerably lower
in these social scientific studies (16 [percent]-19 [percent]) than in the NCVS data for the
same period (32 [percent]-41 [percent]). As the methods for sampling and interviewing
procedures were designed to be comparable, the different estimates were likely due to the
screening questions that were used.”).
114. SOFI SINOZICH & LYNN LANGTON, BUREAU JUST. STATS., RAPE AND SEXUAL ASSAULT
VICTIMIZATION AMONG COLLEGE-AGE FEMALES, 1995-2013, at 9 tbl.8 (2014), https://www.bjs.
gov/content/pub/pdf/rsavcaf9513.pdf [https://perma.cc/QR7Q-V984].
2019] WHY RAPE SHOULD BE A FEDERAL CRIME 1703
commissioned a very large (over 150,000 respondents) survey of
college students.115 Only 25.5 percent of those reporting “physically
forced penetration” said they informed any response agency,
including police, university officials, healthcare providers, and
victims’ services.116
Research also shows that the reasons for not reporting rape have
changed little since the early 1990s. Ronet Bachman analyzed the
1987-1990 NCVS data for the most important reason nonreporting
victims gave.117 Thirty-nine percent said it “was a private or
personal matter,” 20 percent said the police “wouldn’t do anything
about it,” 6 percent said the police “couldn’t do anything [to help],”
and 13 percent said they were “[a]fraid of reprisal from [the]
offender.”118 In the AAU survey released in 2015, 35.9 percent of the
victims of forced penetration said they did not report because they
were “embarrassed, ashamed[,] or that it would be too emotionally
difficult.”119 Twenty-nine percent said they did not report because
they “did not think anything would be done about it.”120
The widespread expectation among survivors that reporting is
both painful and pointless continues to have a foundation in fact.
Professor Deborah Tuerkheimer summarizes some of the evidence
of a nationwide pattern of police not processing rape complaints:
With regard to both stranger and acquaintance rapes, police
failure to investigate sexual assault cases is well documented.
Consistent with the nationwide data, close examination of
particular jurisdictions, including Los Angeles, Baltimore, St.
Louis, New Orleans, New York, Salt Lake County, and Missoula,
115. DAVID CANTOR ET AL., WESTAT, REPORT ON THE AAU CAMPUS CLIMATE SURVEY ON
SEXUAL ASSAULT AND SEXUAL MISCONDUCT, at vi (2017), https://www.aau.edu/sites/default/
files/AAU-Files/Key-Issues/Campus-Safety/AAU-Campus-Climate-Survey-FINAL-10-20-17
.pdf [https://perma.cc/8EL7-MWUP].
116. See id. at 35.
117. Ronet Bachman, Predicting the Reporting of Rape Victimizations: Have Rape Reforms
Made a Difference?, 20 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 254, 256, 264 tbl.1 (1993).
118. Id. at 264 tbl.1. 
119. CANTOR ET AL., supra note 115, at 36. Although it is not absolutely clear, these
percentages appear to be based on the total number of respondents reporting forced
penetration rather than on the number of victims who said they did not report. 
120. Id.
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Montana, underscores that poor handling of rape cases by police
is rampant.121
As a recent study by Human Rights Watch (HRW) points out, the
implication is that rising rates of reported rapes are a positive sign
of better policing.122
The number of complaints stonewalled by the police is uncertain.
The problem, however, is clearly substantial.123 The HRW study
noted that:
[R]eported rapes rose 30 percent in Baltimore after police
officers were required to refer all sexual assault cases to
detectives for review. And in New Orleans, the number of
reported sexual assaults jumped 49 percent following changes
requiring the commander of the Sex Crimes section to sign off on
the classifications for all sexual assault cases.124
Recent social science research, qualitative and quantitative,
suggests that the suppression of rape complaints by the police is
widespread. Rose Corrigan led a research project that recorded
interviews with 167 victim advocates working at 112 rape crisis
centers in 6 different states.125 Corrigan’s findings were dishearten-
ing: “The sheer number, variety, and similarity of these stories
indicates that negative, dismissive, or even abusive practices by
police are not unique or unusual, but rather persist in many
communities and affect potentially thousands of victims each year
who do attempt to report a sexual assault to the police.”126
121. Deborah Tuerkheimer, Underenforcement as Unequal Protection, 57 B.C. L. REV. 1287,
1294-95 (2016) (footnotes omitted).
122. See HUM. RTS. WATCH, IMPROVING POLICE RESPONSE TO SEXUAL ASSAULT 1 (2013),
https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/improvingSAInvest_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/
37NM-5KW6] (“[L]ow numbers or very high clearance rates can indicate selective
documentation of cases. On the other hand, high numbers of reported rapes can signal
increased confidence in police and more accurate data collection and reporting by police
departments.”).
123. See, e.g., Soraya Chemaly, How Police Still Fail Rape Victims, ROLLING STONE (Aug.
16, 2016, 8:29 PM), https://www.rollingstone.com/culture/culture-features/how-police-still-fail-
rape-victims-97782/ [https://perma.cc/U4VU-3T4U].
124. HUM. RTS. WATCH, supra note 122, at 1 (footnote omitted).
125. See ROSE CORRIGAN, UP AGAINST A WALL: RAPE REFORM AND THE FAILURE OF SUCCESS
4 (2013). 
126. Id. at 94. 
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Corey Rayburn Yung used a statistical outlier detection technique
to obtain a quantitative estimate of police undercounting rape
complaints.127 Using changes in murder rates as a baseline for
identifying outliers, Yung found that “796,213 to 1,145,309 rapes
were not included in the UCR due to police undercounting from
1995 to 2012.”128 Yung’s low estimate of lost complaints, divided by
the seventeen years of the study period, would mean that the police,
on average, turned away more than 46,000 complaints per year.129
Between 1996 and 2012, the number of rapes reported each year by
the UCR varied, but never exceeded 97,000 or fell below 84,000.130
In other words, if Yung’s estimate is correct, roughly a third of the
rape complaints brought to the police are not officially reported.
Evidence that police do not pursue so many complaints reinforces
pessimistic interpretations of the incidence and reporting num-
bers.131 It also has pessimistic implications for assessing police
investigations of those complaints they record.132
2. The Clearance-by-Arrest Rate for Rape Remains Low
In 1995, 51.1 percent of rapes reported to the UCR system using
the legacy definition were cleared by arrest.133 Subsequently, the
clearance rate has declined dramatically.134 In 2015, the official
clearance rates were 37.1 percent using the revised definition, and
36.4 percent using the legacy definition.135 In 2016, the official
127. Corey Rayburn Yung, How to Lie with Rape Statistics: America’s Hidden Rape Crisis,
99 IOWA L. REV. 1197, 1203 (2014). 
128. Id. at 1239.
129. Cf. id.
130. See FBI Data, 1996-2015, supra note 44.
131. See Yung, supra note 127, at 1241.
132. See infra Part I.B.2.
133. FED. BUREAU INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEP’T JUST., UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS: CRIME IN
THE UNITED STATES, 1995, at 199 tbl.25 (1996), https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/1995/95sec3.
pdf [https://perma.cc/WE4E-UZQR].
134. See Lonsway & Archambault, supra note 56, at 150 (“When this computation was
made for forcible rape across time, the ratio of reports to arrests was in the 50 [percent] range
in the 1970s and decreased steadily to 26 [percent] in 2008.”).
135. Table 27: Percent of Offenses Cleared by Arrest or Exceptional Means, Additional
Information About Selected Offenses by Population Group, 2015, FED. BUREAU INVESTIGATION
[hereinafter Percent of Offenses Cleared by Arrest, 2015], https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-
u.s/2015/crime-in-the-u.s.-2015/tables/table-27 [https://perma. cc/66WJ-S6A6].
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clearance rates were 36.5 percent using the revised definition, and
40.9 percent using the legacy definition.136 The increase in the
clearance rate under the legacy definition was not enough to offset
a decline in the clearance rate for the revised definition, which
includes the legacy cases and therefore offers a better measure of
overall trends.137
In the “Crime in the United States by Volume and Rate per
100,000 inhabitants” section, the 2016 UCR reports 95,730 forcible
rapes using the legacy definition, and 130,603 using the expanded
definition that includes any form of penetration—vaginal, oral, or
anal—that takes place without the victim’s consent (regardless of
whether force was used).138 The section on clearances uses a
different data set limited to agencies reporting clearances for at
least a six-month period.139 The 2016 clearance data showed 6822
rapes under the legacy definition, and 111,241 using the expanded
definition.140
The clearance rate can be substantially higher than the number
of arrests in two ways. First, one arrest may clear multiple
crimes.141 While it is unlikely that an arrest on a drug or robbery
charge would clear a rape charge, one arrested rapist might be
responsible for several reported rapes, and perhaps for other
offenses too.142 Most rapists commit multiple offenses.143
136. Table 17: Percent of Offenses Cleared by Arrest or Exceptional Means by Population
Group, 2016, FED. BUREAU INVESTIGATION [hereinafter Percent of Offenses Cleared by Arrest,
2016], https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/2016/crime-in-the-u.s.-2016/tables/table-17 [https://
perma.cc/76G8-9VCE].
137. See FED. BUREAU INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEP’T JUST., UNIFORM CRIME REPORT: CRIME
IN THE UNITED STATES, 2013, RAPE ADDENDUM 1-2 (2014), https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-
u.s/2013/crime-in-the-u.s.-2013/rape-addendum/rape_addendum_final.pdf [https://perma.cc/
7YLK-98CG]. The revised definition is inclusive of the legacy definition, but adds forcible oral
and anal penetration, includes male victims, and counts arrests for penetration without
consent but absent force. See id. at 1. The revised definition also merges attempts and
completed offenses. See id.
138. FBI Data, 1997-2016, supra note 80.
139. See, e.g., Percent of Offenses Cleared by Arrest, 2016, supra note 136.
140. See id.
141. FED. BUREAU INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEP’T JUST., UNIFORM CRIME REPORT: CRIME IN THE
UNITED STATES, 2010, OFFENSES CLEARED 1 (2011), https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/2010/
crime-in-the-u.s.-2010/clearancetopic.pdf [https://perma.cc/E8S5-AZQL].
142. See David Lisak & Paul M. Miller, Repeat Rape and Multiple Offending Among
Undetected Rapists, 17 VIOLENCE & VICTIMS 73, 80-81 (2002).
143. See, e.g., id. at 78 (stating that authors identified 120 undetected rapists in a sample
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Second, the FBI now counts the percentage of cases cleared by
arrest or exceptional means.144 The latter category includes reports
that turned out not to be crimes, such as when a reported murder is
later ruled a suicide.145 It also includes cases in which the police
have identified but cannot charge the offender, such as when the
suspect has died.146
Exceptional clearances are more common in rape cases than for
other crimes.147 The National Institute of Justice commissioned a
detailed study of sexual assault cases investigated by the Los
Angeles Police Department (LAPD) and the Los Angeles County
Sheriff ’s Department (LASD).148 The report by Cassia Spohn and
Katharine Tellis included quantitative analysis of case attrition
from court records, analysis of case files, and interviews not just
with survivors, but also with police and prosecutors.149 Spohn and
Tellis found that:
Consistent with the findings of prior research, ... there is
substantial attrition in sexual assault cases reported to the LAPD
and the LASD. Among cases reported to the LAPD, only one in
nine was cleared by arrest, fewer than one in ten resulted in the
of 1882 male university students, a majority of the rapists committed multiple rapes, and
these repeated rapists averaged 5.8 rapes per rapist). Studies of convicted rapists report even
higher numbers. See id. at 74.
144. See FED. BUREAU INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEP’T JUST., UNIFORM CRIME REPORT: CRIME
IN THE UNITED STATES, 2015, DATA DECLARATION 2 (2016), https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-
u.s/2015/crime-in-the-u.s.-2015/tables/table-43/tab43datadec_final.pdf [https://perma.cc/G9
XS-9HJ4] (“The percentage of crimes cleared by arrest is obtained first by dividing the
number of offenses cleared by the number of offenses known and then multiplying the
resulting figure by 100.”).
145. See FED. BUREAU INVESTIGATION, supra note 141, at 1-2.
146. See id.
147. See JOANNE ARCHAMBAULT & KIMBERLY A. LONSWAY, END VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN
INT’L, CLEARANCE METHODS FOR SEXUAL ASSAULT CASES 16, http://www.evawintl.org/library/
DocumentLibraryHandler.ashx?id=34 [https://perma.cc/SQC3-9SSB] (“Unfortunately, there
is evidence that some law enforcement agencies across the country use exceptional clearance
improperly, either because they cannot find the victim or because he/she is viewed as ‘unco-
operative.’ Some agencies also prematurely close their sexual assault cases with exceptional
clearance—even before they have been thoroughly investigated—because the local prosecutor
has indicated that the case will not be pursued.”).
148. See generally CASSIA SPOHN & KATHARINE TELLIS, POLICING AND PROSECUTING SEXUAL
ASSAULT IN LOS ANGELES CITY AND COUNTY (2012), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/
237582.pdf [https://perma.cc/85K7-LW68].
149. See id. at I.
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filing of charges, and only one in thirteen resulted in a convic-
tion. For cases reported to the LASD, about one in four reports
was cleared by arrest, one in six resulted in the filing of charges,
and one in seven resulted in a conviction.150
Moreover, the “locus of case attrition is the decision to arrest or not;
the overwhelming majority of reports of sexual assault do not result
in the arrest of a suspect.”151 “[O]veruse of the exceptional clearance”
resulted in the LAPD reporting a clearance rate of 45.7 percent
when the rate of clearance by arrest was only 12.2 percent.152
Whether other jurisdictions follow the same reporting process as
Los Angeles is uncertain. Also uncertain is the extent to which
overuse of the exceptional clearance is offset by rape arrests clearing
more than one rape. What seems clear is that the clearance rate is
low and falling, and may very well be even lower than officially
reported.153
The data on clearances are even more concerning than they first
appear. First, the police do not report a significant number of com-
plaints. The reported offenses number in the clearance rate calcu-
lation therefore ought to be considerably higher. Second, the period
of dramatic decline in clearance rates for rape coincided with the
advent of both polymerase chain reaction (PCR) DNA testing154 and
the establishment of searchable databases containing identifying
information for thousands of prior offenders.155 As solving rape cases
became less difficult, the clearance rate should have gone up.156
150. Id. at VIII. 
151. Id.
152. Id. at IV. LASD reported a clearance rate of 88.7 percent, but the clearance by arrest
rate was only 34.7 percent. Id. 
153. See, e.g., supra notes 133-36, 151-52 and accompanying text.
154. See History of DNA Testing, DNA DIAGNOSTICS CTR., https://dnacenter.com/history-
dna-testing/ [https://perma.cc/9TUK-9LVG].
155. See Combined DNA Index System (CODIS), FED. BUREAU INVESTIGATION, https://www.
fbi.gov/services/laboratory/biometric-analysis/codis [https://perma.cc/4TP4-GZAU]. According
to the FBI’s website:
The FBI Laboratory’s CODIS began as a pilot software project in 1990, serving
14 state and local laboratories. The DNA Identification Act of 1994 formalized
the FBI’s authority to establish a National DNA Index System (NDIS) for law
enforcement purposes. Today, over 190 public law enforcement laboratories
participate in NDIS across the United States.
Id.
156. See Joseph L. Giacalone, In Focus: Investigating and Solving Sexual Assaults,
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3. Justified Rape Prosecutions Remain Hard to Win
When a prosecution is initiated, the attrition rate for rape cases,
while high, is not dramatically different than for other serious
crimes. The BJS periodically surveys the seventy-five largest
counties for data on felony prosecution outcomes.157 The most recent
such study appeared in 2013 and analyzed data from 2009.158
In cases that were adjudicated within the one-year study period,
sixty-eight of ninety-five accused rapists were convicted, fifty-seven
on felony charges and eleven for misdemeanors.159 The 66 percent
overall conviction rate and the 54 percent total felony-conviction
rate compares favorably to the 61 percent total rate and 49 percent
felony-conviction rate for violent offenses overall.160 The high con-
viction rates for rape are possible, however, only because of the
extraordinary screening of rape cases before charges are filed.161
The same BJS survey shows that rape was the most serious
charge in only 1 percent of all felony cases,162 and the most serious
offense of conviction for only 0.5 percent of convicted defendants.163
The 2009 UCR reported 5.8 times as many rapes as murder,164 while
prosecutors charged rape as the most serious charge only 1.4 times
as often as murder in the 2009 survey of felony defendants.165
Robbery was more likely to be prosecuted than rape, but by a much
smaller ratio.166 For every rape accusation in the survey, there were
LEXISNEXIS, http://blogs.lexisnexis.com/public-safety/2016/04/sexual-assault-crimes/ [https://
perma.cc/WXT8-GEAV].
157. See, e.g., BRIAN A. REAVES, BUREAU JUST. STATS., FELONY DEFENDANTS IN LARGE UR-
BAN COUNTIES, 2009-STATISTICAL TABLES (2013), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/fdluc09.
pdf [https://perma.cc/U324-X3TM].
158. See id.
159. Id. at 24 tbl.21. 
160. Id.
161. See Lonsway & Archambault, supra note 56, at 155.
162. REAVES, supra note 157, at 3 tbl.1. 
163. Id. at 25 tbl.22. 
164. FBI Data, 1996-2015, supra note 44 (showing 89,241 reported rapes and 15,399
reported murders in 2009). 
165. REAVES, supra note 157, at 3 tbl.1 (showing that murder was most serious charge in
0.7 percent of cases and rape in 1 percent). 
166. See id., at 3 tbl.1 (finding robbery to be the most serious charge in 6.8 percent of the
cases and rape in 1 percent); FBI Data, 1996-2015, supra note 44, (finding that 408,742
robberies were reported compared to 89,241 rapes, or 4.6 robberies for each rape). 
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14.8 drug-trafficking charges.167 Keeping the conviction rate for rape
up depends on limiting charges to the strongest cases.168
C. Prospects for Reform
The academic literature on rape concentrates on the appropriate
scope of the offense. The scholarly mainstream supports extending
liability by dropping the force element and making sex without
consent the crime.169 Some thoughtful skeptics propose replacing the
sexual autonomy protected by the consent standard with the pro-
tection of some other value as the gravamen of rape.170 The defini-
tion of rape fully deserves the intellectual firepower devoted to it.171
That said, the failure to enforce effectively even current law is a
pachyderm in the pavilion if ever there were one.
Scholars have provided an intellectual feast of arguments about
the meaning and appropriate roles of consent and force. When it
comes to increasing reports, arrests, and convictions, however, the
academic cupboard is virtually bare.172 Decades ago, reformers
167. REAVES, supra note 157, at 3 tbl.1.
168. Cf. Lonsway & Archambault, supra note 56, at 155.
169. See, e.g., David P. Bryden, Redefining Rape, 3 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 317, 322 (2000)
(“Virtually all modern rape scholars want to modify or abolish the force requirement as an
element of rape.”). The most thoroughly considered proposal for a consent-based regime is the
draft revision of the American Law Institute’s (ALI) Model Penal Code. See MODEL PENAL
CODE § 213.1(2) statutory commentary (AM. LAW INST., Discussion Draft No. 2 2015). The
draft was amended in response to objections. See Kevin Cole, Backpedaling in Place: The ALI’s
Move from “Affirmative” to “Contextual” Consent, SAN DIEGO L. REV. (forthcoming) (manu-
script at 1) https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2714057 [https://perma.cc/
KZ5J-CDSN]. The ALI Council rejected the revised draft in the Spring of 2016. See Bradford
Richardson, American Law Institute Rejects Affirmative Consent Standard in Defining Sexual
Assault, WASH. TIMES (May 17, 2016), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2016/may/17/
american-law-institute-rejects-affirmative-consent/ [https://perma.cc/27FJ-PSYV].
170. See, e.g., JOHN GARDNER, The Wrongness of Rape, in OFFENCES AND DEFENCES 1, 15
(2007) (arguing that rape is wrong because it objectifies the victim); MacKinnon, supra note
3 (arguing that equality, not consent, should be the basis of rape law); Jed Rubenfeld, The
Riddle of Rape-by-Deception and the Myth of Sexual Autonomy, 122 YALE L.J. 1372 (2012)
(arguing that “self-possession,” not consent, should be the basis of rape law). For a critique
of Rubenfeld’s argument, see Corey Rayburn Yung, Rape Law Fundamentals, 27 YALE J.L.
& FEMINISM 1 (2015).
171. For a recent contribution to these debates, see generally, for example, Stephen J.
Schulhofer, Reforming the Law of Rape, 35 LAW & INEQ. 335 (2017).
172. One promising policy is issuing civil protection orders based on sexual abuse as well
as nonsexual batteries. See Shawn E. Fields, Debunking the Stranger-in-the-Bushes Myth: The
Case for Sexual Assault Protection Orders, 2017 WIS. L. REV. 429. Civil remedies, however,
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offered two promising proposals to improve enforcement: shield laws
and expert testimony on rape trauma syndrome (RTS).173 Legisla-
tures and courts embraced both.174
However, these reforms have failed to overcome systemic skep-
ticism about rape complainants.175 Police officers and prosecutors
who do not share the prevailing stereotypes must account for the
fact that ordinary citizens will bring the old rape myths with them
into the jury room.176 Officers and prosecutors who entertain the
same stereotypes can rationalize rejecting complaints because “we
are only doing what a jury would do anyway.”177
like criminal penalties, depend on the willingness of victims to report—and reporting has been
going down. See supra Part I.B.1.
173. See Arthur H. Garrison, Rape Trauma Syndrome: A Review of a Behavioral Science
Theory and Its Admissibility in Criminal Trials, 23 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 591, 591 (2000) (“In
1974, Drs. Ann Burgess and Lynda Holmstrom coined the term ‘Rape Trauma Syndrome’ ...
to explain the reactions and coping mechanisms that rape victims may use to deal with the
violation of a forcible rape.”); Cristina Carmody Tilley, A Feminist Repudiation of the Rape
Shield Laws, 51 DRAKE L. REV. 45, 48-51 (2002) (outlining the history of rape shield laws).
174. See, e.g., Tilley, supra note 173, at 46 (“Michigan adopted the nation’s first rape shield
law in 1974, after an unlikely coalition of feminists and ‘law and order’ politicians organized
a national consciousness-raising about the frequency of rape and the rarity of prosecution and
conviction.” (footnote omitted)); see also id. at 45 (“The federal government and forty-eight
states currently enforce some version of a so-called rape shield law.”). RTS evidence is
generally, but not universally, admissible. See Garrison, supra note 173, at 629 (“[S]ince the
Marks case, a total of twenty-five states and the military have ruled expert testimony on RTS
syndrome evidence admissible, seven states have ruled expert testimony on RTS evidence
inadmissible, and eighteen states and the District of Columbia have not directly ruled on the
admissibility of RTS. With the addition of states that (1) allow lay witness testimony on the
emotional and psychological effects of a rape on a victim, while prohibiting expert testimony
on RTS, and (2) allow expert testimony on the emotional and physical condition of the victim
after the immediate incident, a total of twenty-nine (90 [percent]) of the states that have
directly addressed the admissibility of testimony on RTS and rape victimology have held that
such evidence is admissible.” (footnote omitted)).
175. See, e.g., STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, UNWANTED SEX: THE CULTURE OF INTIMIDATION
AND THE FAILURE OF LAW 17 (1998) (“Social attitudes are tenacious, and they can easily nullify
the theories and doctrines found in the law books. The story of failed reforms is in part a story
about the overriding importance of culture, about the seeming irrelevance of law.”).
176. See Hildebrand & Najdowski, supra note 25, at 1061-62.
177. Cf. id. Whether internalization or rationalization is the larger cause is uncertain. The
prevalence of rape myths among police officers, however, is significant. See, e.g., id. at 1064
(“Social science research shows that rape myths are widely and persistently held in American
society. For example, Feild’s survey of laypeople, police officers, rape crisis counselors, and
institutionalized rapists revealed that, on average, participants endorsed fourteen out of
thirty-two prejudicial or erroneous beliefs about rape (e.g., ‘A woman should feel guilty
following a rape’). Attitudes toward rape differed significantly between rapists and the other
subgroups of participants, but not necessarily in the direction one might expect. For example,
1712 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 60:1685
Legislatures continued the quest for effective enforcement by
adopting innovative, arguably sinister, sanctions, such as civil
commitment and sex-offender registries.178 Ironically, the severity
of these measures may have added to the reluctance of criminal
justice actors to arrest, charge, and convict.179 Even if these mea-
sures have not made things worse, the incidence and reporting
statistics show they have not made things better.180
Legislators and judges clearly have shown the political will to act
against rape.181 Indeed, in the campaign against rape, they have
resorted to expedients thought out of proportion even to the war on
drugs.182 The recent literature betrays a sense of frustration and
rapists were more likely than other participants to think it is women’s responsibility to
prevent rape. Yet, community members, police officers, and rape crisis counselors were more
likely than rapists to think that women precipitate rape through their appearance or
behavior, and that women should try to resist rape during an attack.” (footnotes omitted)).
178. See supra notes 97-98 and accompanying text.
179. Registration makes it hard for offenders to find work, which increases the risk of
recidivism. See Adam Shajnfeld & Richard B. Krueger, Reforming (Purportedly) Non-Punitive
Responses to Sexual Offending, 25 DEV. MENTAL HEALTH L. 81, 91-92 (2006). Some evidence
suggests that registration deters offending, but these gains may be offset by increased
recidivism. See J.J. Prescott & Jonah E. Rockoff, Do Sex Offender Registration and
Notification Laws Affect Criminal Behavior?, 54 J.L. & ECON. 161 (2011). Moreover, the
decline in reported offenses may be the result of deterring reports and arrests rather than
deterring offenses. See CORRIGAN, supra note 125, at 233 (“By further discouraging
identification, prosecution, and conviction of sex crimes, SORCN laws contribute to the
erasure of sexual assault in local communities and across the country.”).
The cost of civil commitment is very high. See, e.g., Shajnfeld & Krueger, supra, at 93
(noting that civil commitment in Washington costs $138,000, and that “[o]verall, the cost of
operating special facilities for the commitment of sex offenders at the national level is
estimated to be $224 million per year”). Whatever benefits are achieved by civil commitment
must be balanced against the substantial opportunity cost. See id. at 91. The same funds
devoted to, for example, police and prosecutors might achieve more. Cf. id. at 93.
180. See, e.g., Prescott & Rockoff, supra note 179.
181. See supra notes 93-100 and accompanying text.
182. The most salient examples are sex offender registries and indefinite commitment
under the SVP laws.
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even despair.183 There is, however, one politically feasible and prac-
tically promising reform still to be tried: federal heat.
II. CONGRESSIONAL POWER TO MAKE RAPE A FEDERAL CRIME
The academic literature is moving toward a federal solution. The
suggestions advanced, however, reflect an understandable focus on
gender equality, just as the Violence Against Women Act did.184 The
recent literature suggests involving federal power via the Recon-
struction amendments.185
In United States v. Morrison, the Supreme Court rejected Section
5 of the Fourteenth Amendment as a source of congressional power
over individual acts of sexual violence.186 Equal protection chal-
lenges to nonenforcement by state authorities satisfy the state
action doctrine.187 But equal protection claims in the context of rape
cases would require proof of subjective gender animus.188 The
Supreme Court’s long record of deference to prosecutorial discretion
183. For example, Corrigan chose “Up Against a Wall” as the title for her book. See
CORRIGAN, supra note 125. To take another example, a recent article notes that:
Rape myths are so pervasive and commonly accepted that individuals share
photos and videos of themselves and their peers committing sexual assaults
without fear of repercussions or considerations of culpability. Unfortunately,
these assumptions about rapists’ de facto immunity from legal prosecution as
well as from condemnation in the public sphere are often correct.
Holly Jeanine Boux & Courtenay W. Daum, At the Intersection of Social Media and Rape
Culture: How Facebook Postings, Texting and Other Personal Communications Challenge the
“Real” Rape Myth in the Criminal Justice System, 2015 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 149, 185.
184. See Violence Against Women Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796.
185. See Jane Kim, Taking Rape Seriously: Rape as Slavery, 35 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 263,
266 (2012) (“[R]ape should be considered a form of slavery prohibited by the Thirteenth
Amendment of the Constitution, allowing for the creation of a federal criminal regime to
prosecute and prioritize rape in conjunction with state regimes.”); see also Tuerkheimer, supra
note 121 (arguing that underenforcement could establish gender discrimination in violation
of the Equal Protection Clause).
186. See 529 U.S. 598, 617-27 (2000). 
187. See, e.g., DeShaney v. Winnebago Cty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 196-97, 197
n.3 (1989) (noting that a State is not violating the Due Process Clause by not providing its
citizen with particular services, but that selectively denying services to certain individuals
does violate the Equal Protection Clause).
188. See generally Susannah W. Pollvogt, Unconstitutional Animus, 81 FORDHAM L. REV.
887 (2012).
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suggests an uphill fight.189 Even if a court found gender animus,
there is no promising remedy.190
The most plausible candidate is structural injunctive relief under
42 U.S.C. § 14141.191 Since Congress adopted § 14141, dozens of po-
lice departments have entered consent decrees with the DOJ to
address patterns or practices of racial discrimination and excessive
force.192 In several cases, DOJ has investigated the response to
sexual assault.193 Four of those investigations ended in agreements
by the local agencies to adopt structural reforms.194
189. See, e.g., DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 191 (holding that state actors’ failure to protect a child
victim from private violence does not violate due process); Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821,
837-38 (1985) (holding that nonenforcement decisions by federal agencies are unreviewable
under the Administrative Procedure Act).
190. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 620-27.
191. 42 U.S.C. § 14141 (2012).
192. See CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., U.S. DEP’T JUST., THE CIVIL RIGHTS DIVISION ’S PATTERN AND
PRACTICE POLICE REFORM WORK: 1994-PRESENT 1 (2017), https://www.justice.gov/crt/file/922
421/download [https://perma.cc/BW8D-F9JT] (noting that the Division has opened eleven new
investigations and negotiated nineteen new reform agreements since 2012).
193. See Letter from Michael W. Cotter, U.S. Attorney, Dist. of Mont., to Fred Van
Valkenburg, Cty. Attorney, Missoula Cty. 1 n.1 (Feb. 14, 2014), https://www.clearinghouse.
net/chDocs/public/PN-MT-0003-0001.pdf [https://perma.cc/AXW3-9Q2Q] (“Previous to this
letter, the Division’s Special Litigation Section investigated and publicly issued findings
regarding the response to sexual assault by five other law enforcement agencies: the New
Orleans (LA) Police Department; the Maricopa County (AZ) Sheriff ’s Office; the Puerto Rico
Police Department; and, most recently, the University of Montana’s Office of Public Safety
and the Missoula Police Department.”). The University of Montana Agreement, the Missoula
County Attorney’s Office Agreement, and the Missoula Police Department Agreement all
resulted from the same overall investigation, and the district attorney’s office and police
department each entered a memorandum of understanding with DOJ. See Memorandum of
Understanding Between, the Montana Attorney General, the Missoula County Attorney’s
Office, Missoula County, and the United States Department of Justice (Dec. 13, 2013), https://
www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/crt/legacy/2014/06/10/missoula_settle_6-10-14.pdf [https://
perma.cc/262H-8BAA]; Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Justice Department Announces
Missoula Police Department Has Fully Implemented Agreement to Improve Response to
Reports of Sexual Assault (May 11, 2015), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-
announces-missoula-police-department-has-fully-implemented-agreement [https://perma.cc/
4N2V-7KQ3].
194. See Letter from Michael W. Cotter, U.S. Attorney, Dist. of Mont. to Fred Van Valken-
burg, Cty. Attorney, Missoula Ct., supra note 193, at 1 n.1. (“All but one of these law enforce-
ment agencies—the Maricopa County Sheriff ’s Office—have entered into agreements with
DOJ, aimed at cooperatively resolving the issues identified in DOJ’s investigations and
findings letters.”).
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These injunctions are undoubtedly valuable, but have limited
value, especially as remedies for under- as opposed to over-enforce-
ment. The empirical literature is still in an early stage, but it points
in a plausible direction.195 DOJ intervention makes a significant
difference in the short run.196 After that, positive changes in insti-
tutional culture take root in some cases, and in other cases, the old
institutional culture reasserts itself.197
The DOJ’s response to neglect of sexual assault complaints has
been admirable.198 If neglect of rape complaints were an isolated
problem, a handful of local interventions would have some chance
of success. Local interventions, however, simply cannot make
nationwide progress on a national problem.
The Thirteenth Amendment approach is interesting.199 However,
rape is not chattel “slavery” except in trafficking cases where the
victims are sometimes literally sold.200 Rape bears a strong resem-
blance to “involuntary servitude,” although the latter, especially
when linked with chattel slavery in the constitutional text, suggests
a period of domination longer than the minutes to hours typically
involved in committing rape.201
195. See Joshua Chanin, Evaluating Section 14141: An Empirical Review of Pattern or
Practice Police Misconduct Reform, 14 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 67 (2016).
196. See, e.g., id. at 111 (“The best evidence on the DOJ’s pattern or practice initiative
suggests that after implementing mandated reforms, affected departments will likely possess
a stronger, more capable accountability infrastructure, more robust training, and a set of
policies that reflect national best practices.”).
197. See id. at 112 (“[O]rganizational change is a long and fragile process. Effectiveness is
not guaranteed and early gains do not necessarily equate to institutionalized change.”).
198. See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Justice Department Launches Initiative
to Fight Sexual Harassment in the Workplace (Feb. 28, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/opa/
pr/justice-department-launches-initiative-fight-sexual-harassment-workplace [https://perma.
cc/55U6-MRGX].
199. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIII.
200. Cf. Kim, supra note 185, at 297-98.
201. Cf. id. at 296. The core of the original understanding is reflected in the Peonage
Abolition Act of 1867, 42 U.S.C. § 1994 (2012). To get an understanding of how the meaning
of the Thirteenth Amendment evolved, see, for example, Risa L. Goluboff, The Thirteenth
Amendment in Historical Perspective, 11 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1451 (2009). But equating rape
with slavery would seem to classify all kidnapping as slavery. See Kim, supra note 185, at
299. That seems dubious. Rape was a common incident of African slavery in America. See, e.g.,
Pamela D. Bridgewater, Un/Re/Dis Covering Slave Breeding in Thirteenth Amendment
Jurisprudence, 7 WASH. & LEE RACE & ETHNIC ANC. L.J. 11, 14-15 (2001) (discussing economic
incentive of masters to force slave breeding). It does not follow that slavery is a common
incidence of rape. Cf. Rubenfeld, supra note 170, at 1380 (“Every act of rape may not be an act
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The one court decision addressing this theory rejects it as
unprecedented.202 Even if the constitutional argument prevailed, all
it would do is authorize Congress to adopt legislation.203 Congress
would be unlikely to hazard a major legislative program on the
chance that the courts would agree that the Thirteenth Amendment
addresses rape generally, as distinct from rape as an incident of
slavery.
In any event, there is a more direct and more practical route to
federal prosecutions of sexual assault. An extensive list of statutes
imposes federal liability for violent crime.204 Congressional power to
create these offenses generally stems from the Commerce Clause.205
of slavery or torture, but all rape shares core elements of both.”). One might go further by
noting that the willful dehumanization characteristic of rape is also a characteristic of
murder. See id. at 1430. It does not follow that rape and murder are either conceptually
identical or morally equivalent.
202. See Newsome v. Lee County, 431 F. Supp. 2d 1189, 1198 (M.D. Ala. 2006). Newsome,
a female jail inmate, alleged that she had been raped by male prisoners and that the jail staff
was responsible for the attack. See id. at 1192. Her complaint included one count alleging a
violation of her rights under the Thirteenth Amendment. See id. at 1194, 1198. Chief Judge
Fuller did not deny the logic of the plaintiff’s argument, but he rejected it for want of
authority:
Newsome contends that Tabb, in collaboration with the three inmates, sexually
enslaved her during the course of the rape. This appears to be a novel theory,
and Newsome has not cited any decisional authority that would lead the Court
to believe otherwise. As mentioned above, the Fourteenth Amendment provides
the applicable constitutional standard for the treatment of pretrial detainees,
and the Court has not been provided with adequate reason to deviate from that
approach here. Therefore, Newsome’s claims under the Thirteenth Amendment
are dismissed as to all Officer Defendants.
Id. at 1198. 
203. See Kim, supra note 185, at 300-04.
204. See, e.g., supra notes 10-13 and accompanying text (mentioning robbery, kidnapping,
carjacking, and human trafficking as examples).
205. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. Congress occasionally has predicated federal
jurisdiction on other Article I powers. For example, in Sabri v. United States, the Court
upheld a federal anticorruption statute, 18 U.S.C. § 666(a)(2) (2012), based on the spending
power. 541 U.S. 600, 604-08 (2004). The Court reasoned that when Congress grants money
to state agencies, Congress also has “authority under the Necessary and Proper Clause, Art.
I, § 8, cl. 18, to see to it that taxpayer dollars appropriated under that power are in fact spent
for the general welfare, and not frittered away in graft.” Id. at 605. That protective
justification does not extend to any private activity that has the effect of increasing federal
spending. See Samuel R. Bagenstos, Spending Clause Litigation in the Roberts Court, 58 DUKE
L.J. 345, 349 (2008) (characterizing Sabri as “a case that many thought pressed the limits of
Congress’s spending power”). If the spending power reached so far, Congress could assume
jurisdiction over all intrastate crime by funding a federal victims’ services agency.
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Feminists have teamed with law enforcement interests many times
in the past, often successfully.206 I urge a similar coalition to support
making rape a federal crime.
A. Congressional Power Under the Commerce Clause
The basic structure of Commerce Clause jurisprudence is well-
settled. The Court laid that structure out in United States v. Lopez:
Consistent with this structure, we have identified three broad
categories of activity that Congress may regulate under its
commerce power. First, Congress may regulate the use of the
channels of interstate commerce. Second, Congress is empow-
ered to regulate and protect the instrumentalities of interstate
commerce, or persons or things in interstate commerce, even
though the threat may come only from intrastate activities.
Finally, Congress’[s] commerce authority includes the power to
regulate those activities having a substantial relation to
interstate commerce, i.e., those activities that substantially
affect interstate commerce.207
For the first time since the New Deal days, the Lopez Court held
Congress exceeded its powers under the substantial effects prong.208
Controversy and uncertainty have attended the third prong ever
since.209 The jurisprudence of the first prong, at least, is clear.
Congress can adopt legislation not just to prevent destruction or
obstruction of the means of commerce, such as aircrafts, trains and
the Internet;210 Congress can also prohibit use of those channels to
harm innocent people.211 Longstanding precedent upholding federal
206. See, e.g., Claire Houston, How Feminist Theory Became (Criminal) Law: Tracing the
Path to Mandatory Criminal Intervention in Domestic Violence Cases, 21 MICH. J. GENDER &
L. 217 (2014).
207. 514 U.S. 549, 558-59 (1995) (internal citations omitted).
208. See id. at 551.
209. See generally Kathleen F. Brickey, Crime Control and the Commerce Clause: Life After
Lopez, 46 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 801, 817-22 (1996).
210. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558.
211. See id.
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regulation of interstate marketing of adulterated food or misbrand-
ed drugs is one example.212 Wire fraud is another.213
The second prong is clear in at least one respect. While people or
goods are moving across state lines, Congress has power to “regulate
and protect.”214 The difficulty has been defining “moving.”215 At any
one time, persons and goods are in one state or another. The
normative question the doctrine occludes is the temporal one of how
long people or goods can stay in one state before they lose their
character as “persons or things in interstate commerce.”216
Suppose a terrorist ships a bomb to an accomplice in another
state. The accomplice places the bomb next to the target, say a
government building. The terrorist has a transmitter that can
detonate the bomb at any time, but only from close proximity. If the
terrorist crosses into the state of the target building, and immedi-
ately drives by and detonates the bomb, it seems clear that he has
used “things in interstate commerce” to cause harm.217 But what if
the terrorist has a conversion on the way to Damascus, embraces
local values, and settles down for twenty years—at which point a
change in government policy enrages him and he returns to the site
of the bomb to detonate it?
The modern doctrine of “jurisdictional elements” takes the view
that no matter how long ago an article moved in commerce,
Congress can regulate its use to prevent harm.218 Prior to Lopez, in
United States v. Bass, the Supreme Court held that federal felon-in-
possession statutes required proof of a jurisdictional element.219
Subsequently, in Scarborough v. United States, the issue was
“whether proof that the possessed firearm previously traveled in
interstate commerce is sufficient to satisfy the statutorily required
212. See, e.g., Hipolite Egg Co. v. United States, 220 U.S. 45 (1911).
213. See, e.g., United States v. Jinian, 725 F.3d 954, 958 (9th Cir. 2013) (upholding the
federal wire fraud statute as a valid exercise of the Commerce Clause).
214. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558.
215. See, e.g., Houston, E. & W. Tex. Ry. v. United States, 234 U.S. 342, 349 (1914).
216. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558; United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941) (concerning
the regulation of wage and hour standards); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S.
1 (1937) (concerning federal interference in strikes).
217. Cf. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558.
218. See Scarborough v. United States, 431 U.S. 563, 568-75 (1977).
219. 404 U.S. 336, 351 (1971) (“[T]hat ‘in commerce or affecting commerce’ is part of the
offense of possessing or receiving a firearm.”). 
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nexus between the possession of a firearm by a convicted felon and
commerce.”220 The Scarborough Court answered this question in the
affirmative, holding that even if the gun moved in commerce before
the defendant’s felony conviction, liability still attached under the
statute.221
The issue in Lopez was whether Congress had power to adopt the
federal statute prohibiting gun possession near schools.222 Congress
did not make legislative findings that guns near schools had effects
on commerce.223 Yet the government refused to allege or prove that
the defendant’s gun had crossed state lines, although such proof was
available.224 The prosecution relied solely on the third prong—
effects—to support the statute.225
The Court rejected the government’s argument, giving three
principal reasons.226 First, the challenged law was “a criminal
statute that by its terms has nothing to do with ‘commerce’ or any
sort of economic enterprise, however broadly one might define those
terms.”227 Second, the statute contained “no jurisdictional element
which would ensure, through case-by-case inquiry, that the firearm
possession in question affects interstate commerce.”228 The Court
concluded that “[t]o uphold the Government’s contentions here, [the
Court] would have to pile inference upon inference in a manner that
would bid fair to convert congressional authority under the Com-
merce Clause to a general police power of the sort retained by the
220. 431 U.S. at 564.
221. See id. at 577 (“Indeed, it was a close question in Bass whether § 1202(a) even
required proof of any nexus at all in individual cases. The only reason we concluded it did was
because it was not ‘plainly and unmistakably’ clear that it did not. But there is no question
that Congress intended no more than a minimal nexus requirement.” (internal citation
omitted)).
222. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 551.
223. See id. at 562-63.
224. See United States v. Lopez, 2 F.3d 1342, 1368 (5th Cir. 1993) (“Here, in fact, the
parties stipulated that a [ ]ATF agent was prepared to testify that Lopez’s gun had been
manufactured outside of the State of Texas. Lopez’s conviction must still be reversed,
however, because his indictment did not allege any connection to interstate commerce. An
indictment that fails to allege a commerce nexus, where such a nexus is a necessary element
of the offense, is defective.”). 
225. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 563-64.
226. See id. at 559-68.
227. Id. at 561. 
228. Id.
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States.”229 Third, Congress had not made express legislative findings
that guns near schools affect commerce.230
The Lopez opinion did not refer to several other facts that made
the case difficult for the government. The statute intruded not just
on one, but two traditional spheres of state authority: criminal
justice and education.231 Lopez himself had no criminal record and
had been convicted on a state charge.232 The prosecution did not
involve an organized gang or conditions of employment at a sub-
stantial business.233
Those commentators who were skeptical about the practical
significance of the shift in doctrine turned out to be right.234 After
Lopez, the lower federal courts have carried these decisions forward
as constitutional, rather than statutory, rulings without exception
(although some of the judges have recorded either dissents or
misgivings).235 Congress promptly amended § 922(q) to add a ju-
risdictional element, and the lower courts generally approve the
amended statute as within the commerce power.236 The decisions
likewise uniformly reject Lopez-based challenges to § 922(g) (felon
in possession).237
229. Id. at 567. 
230. Id. at 563 (“[T]o the extent that congressional findings would enable us to evaluate the
legislative judgment that the activity in question substantially affected interstate commerce,
even though no such substantial effect was visible to the naked eye, they are lacking here.”). 
231. See id. at 564-67.
232. See Louis H. Pollak, Foreword, 94 MICH. L. REV. 533, 541-42 (1995).
233. Cf. id. at 541 n.44.
234. See Deborah Jones Merritt, Commerce!, 94 MICH. L. REV. 674, 676 (1995) (“Lopez
marks a minor constitutional revolution. The practical effect of the revolution in the courts,
however, will be small.”); Pollak, supra note 232, at 553 (“[T]here is less in Lopez than meets
the eye.”).
235. See Merritt, supra note 234, at 712-28.
236. See, e.g., United States v. Nieves-Castaño, 480 F.3d 597, 602 (1st Cir. 2007) (noting
that the current form of § 922(q) “provide[s] necessary connections to interstate commerce”);
United States v. Dorsey, 418 F.3d 1038, 1046 (9th Cir. 2005) (“This new version of § 922(q)
... incorporates a ‘jurisdictional element which would ensure ... that the firearm possession
in question affects interstate commerce.’” (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561)); United States v.
Danks, 221 F.3d 1037, 1038-39 (8th Cir. 1999) (“[S]ection 922(q) contains language that
ensures ... that the firearm in question affects interstate commerce.”).
237. See United States v. Hill, 386 F.3d 855, 859 (8th Cir. 2004); United States v. Mitchell,
299 F.3d 632, 634-35 (7th Cir. 2002); United States v. Scott, 263 F.3d 1270, 1272-74 (11th Cir.
2001); United States v. Baer, 235 F.3d 561, 563 (10th Cir. 2000); United States v. Bostic, 168
F.3d 718, 723 (4th Cir. 1999); United States v. Turner, 77 F.3d 887, 888-89 (6th Cir. 1996).
The notorious 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) adds mandatory minimum firearms enhancements to drug
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The Justices face an unappetizing dilemma. If the Court holds
that mere passage of the firearm in commerce is not enough to
establish federal jurisdiction, enforcement of federal firearms laws
would be burdened by the need to prove that the accused in each
case acquired or used the weapon near in time to its passage
through commerce. In many cases, that would not be possible.
Moreover, a new limit on jurisdiction presumably would apply
retroactively because the constitutional defect goes to the legality of
the primary conduct defined by the firearms laws.238 Prisoners
currently serving sentences predicated on Scarborough would have
a right to immediate release.239 In only a few cases would the
government have better prospects of proving a greater commerce
nexus at a retrial than was proved at the first.
The alternative would be to affirm the constitutionality of the
statutory interpretation in Scarborough.240 That would save the gun
laws, but at the price of intellectual embarrassment.241 Under the
second prong, when defendants or victims move in interstate
commerce, Congress has jurisdiction to punish the former and
protect the latter.242 If Scarborough is right to reject any temporal
limitation on jurisdictional elements,243 the reach of the commerce
power logically extends to any defendant or any victim who has ever
traveled across state lines.244 That seems absurd.
trafficking or violent offenses “for which the person may be prosecuted in a court of the United
States,” so federal jurisdiction for the gun offense follows from federal jurisdiction to prosecute
the predicate crime. 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A) (2012).
238. See Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 307 (1989) (adopting Justice Harlan’s view that new
constitutional rules apply retroactively when, inter alia, the rule “places ‘certain kinds of
primary, private individual conduct beyond the power of the criminal law-making authority
to proscribe’” (quoting Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 692 (1971))).
239. Cf. id.
240. See Craig M. Bradley, Federalism and the Federal Criminal Law, 55 HASTINGS L.J.
573, 599 (2004) (noting that lower courts continue to rely on Scarborough).
241. Cf. id. (referring to Scarborough as “bad law”).
242. See, e.g., United States v. Jackson, 978 F.2d 903, 910-11 (5th Cir. 1992).
243. See Scarborough v. United States, 431 U.S. 563, 577 (1977).
244. See Bradley, supra note 240, at 578 (“Since almost everything, or some of its
components, has moved in interstate commerce at some point, mere past movement in
interstate commerce, unconnected to the instant crime, would not seem to satisfy the ‘non-
infinity’ principle that Lopez was announcing.”); Diane McGimsey, The Commerce Clause and
Federalism After Lopez and Morrison: The Case for Closing the Jurisdictional-Element
Loophole, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 1675, 1679-80 (2002) (“Today, however, with the vastly increased
integration of our society, almost every person or good will, at some point, cross a state line.”).
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In the face of this dilemma, the Court has gone into denial and
dodged the issue, despite many opportunities to grant certiorari and
clarify the status of jurisdictional elements after Lopez.245 Most
prominently, in United States v. Alderman, the Ninth Circuit relied
on Scarborough to uphold a federal statute making it a crime for
persons convicted of a violent felony to possess body armor.246 Two
judges voted to uphold the statute, but they voiced some disquiet by
quoting two other circuits: “Any doctrinal inconsistency between
Scarborough and the Supreme Court’s more recent decisions is not
for this Court to remedy.”247
Judge Paez filed a stout dissent,248 then again dissented, joined by
three other judges, from the denial of Alderman’s petition for
rehearing en banc.249 Alderman, fortified by the arguments of the
four dissenters and the equivocation of the panel majority, sought
certiorari.250 The Supreme Court denied the petition over the dissent
of Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Scalia.251 Justice Thomas wrote
that with the certiorari denial “the Court tacitly accepts the
nullification of our recent Commerce Clause jurisprudence.”252
The persistence of the jurisdictional-element doctrine meant that
Lopez had no practical effect on federal firearms prosecutions.253
Lopez, however, had at least one important aftershock. Five years
after Lopez, the Court, in United States v. Morrison, struck down
§ 13981 of the Violence Against Women Act.254 Section 13981(c)
created a private cause of action to recover damages for any “crim[e]
of violence motivated by gender.”255 As in Lopez, the government
defended the statute based only on the ground that violence against
women “substantially affects” commerce.256
245. See McGimsey, supra note 244, at 1706, 1720.
246. 565 F.3d 641, 645-46 (9th Cir. 2009). 
247. Id. at 648 (quoting United States v. Patton, 451 F.3d 615, 636 (10th Cir. 2006)).
248. Id. (Paez, J., dissenting).
249. United States v. Alderman, 593 F.3d 1141, 1141 (9th Cir. 2010) (O’Scannlain, J.,
dissenting).
250. See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Alderman v. United States, 562 U.S. 1163 (2011)
(No. 09-1555), 2010 WL 2512739.
251. Alderman v. United States, 562 U.S. 1163, 1163 (2011). 
252. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
253. See supra notes 234-37 and accompanying text.
254. 529 U.S. 598, 601-02 (2000). 
255. Id. at 605 (alteration in original). 
256. Id. at 609 (“Petitioners do not contend that these cases fall within either of the first
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The Court held that § 13981(c) exceeded congressional power
under the Commerce Clause.257 The majority opinion made the same
arguments as in Lopez: Rape was not an economic activity, and the
statute contained no jurisdictional element.258 The Court stated that
“the noneconomic, criminal nature of the conduct at issue was
central” to the decision in Lopez.259 Again, the Court noted that the
challenged statute had no jurisdictional element, stating that
“[s]uch a jurisdictional element may establish that the enactment
is in pursuance of Congress’[s] regulation of interstate commerce.”260
Congress made legislative findings of the effects of violence against
women on commerce, but these were of persuasive force only, and
the majority was not persuaded.261
The prosecution of federal crimes premised on the commerce
power continued unabated. Prosecution for robbery, arson, kidnap-
ping, and murder, supported by specific proof of a nexus to facilities
or instrumentalities of commerce, rather than grounded solely on
congressional assertions of effects, flourish.262 The courts have not
invoked Lopez or Morrison to block enforcement of new federal
offenses, such as carjacking263 and sex trafficking.264
The Court has decided three major Commerce Clause cases since
Morrison. First, in Gonzales v. Raich, the majority veered back
toward pre-Lopez jurisprudence by upholding the application of the
Controlled Substances Act (CSA) to homegrown marijuana, legal
under state law.265 No jurisdictional element was required because
growing marijuana was “economic activity” that had substantial
two of these categories of Commerce Clause regulation. They seek to sustain § 13981 as a
regulation of activity that substantially affects interstate commerce.”).
257. Id. at 617-19.
258. Id. at 610-12.
259. Id. at 610.
260. Id. at 612. 
261. Id. at 614.
262. See generally Brandon L. Bigelow, Note, The Commerce Clause and Criminal Law, 41
B.C. L. REV. 913 (2000).
263. See United States v. Cobb, 144 F.3d 319, 319, 320-21 (4th Cir. 1998) (citing cases from
seven circuits).
264. See United States v. Campbell, 111 F. Supp. 3d 340, 341, 345 (W.D.N.Y. 2015) (“Other
courts addressing this issue have similarly found that § 1591 is a valid exercise of Congress’s
power under the commerce clause.”).
265. 545 U.S. 1, 25-26 (2005). 
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effects when aggregated.266 Second, based on the same logic as
Raich, Taylor v. United States upheld the Hobbs Act conviction of a
defendant accused of robbing drug dealers.267 Third, NFIB v. Se-
belius held that the Commerce Clause does not authorize Congress
to compel people to enter interstate commerce.268
In Jones v. United States, decided a few months after Morrison,
the Court dodged the constitutional issue by deciding the case for
the defense based on the statute.269 Section 844 of Title 18 of the
U.S. Code makes arson of “any building ... used in interstate or
foreign commerce or in any activity affecting interstate or foreign
commerce” a federal felony.270 A pre-Lopez precedent, Russell v.
United States, rejected both statutory and constitutional challenges
to the application of the statute to rental property owned, but not
occupied, by the defendant.271 Jones rebuffed the government’s
understandable reliance on Russell based on the distinction between
owner-occupied and owned-to-rent property.272 The government’s
interpretation would leave “hardly a building in the land” outside
federal power and thus frustrate the statute’s limitation to property
“used” in commerce.273 The Jones opinion also invoked the avoidance
canon, citing Lopez.274 The Jones Court did not discuss the possibil-
ity of a defendant who burns down a duplex, one unit rented and the
other occupied by the accused.275
Court-watchers can read these tea leaves in different ways. The
Court let stand the article-moved-in-commerce theory of the fire-
arms cases, but certiorari denials are both opaque and not author-
itative.276 Raich read Lopez and Morrison narrowly, but purported
266. Id. at 22, 25-26.
267. 136 S. Ct. 2074, 2077-78 (2016).
268. 567 U.S. 519, 552 (2012).
269. 529 U.S. 848, 858-59 (2000).
270. 18 U.S.C. § 844(i) (2012).
271. 471 U.S. 858, 862 (1985).
272. See Jones, 529 U.S. at 857.
273. Id. at 857-58 (“Given the concerns brought to the fore in Lopez, it is appropriate to
avoid the constitutional question that would arise were we to read § 844(i) to render the
‘traditionally local criminal conduct’ in which petitioner Jones engaged ‘a matter for federal
enforcement.’” (quoting United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 350 (1971)).
274. Id. at 858.
275. Cf. id. at 854.
276. See generally Peter Linzer, The Meaning of Certiorari Denials, 79 COLUM. L. REV.
1227, 1228-29 (1979).
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to respect them.277 The Sebelius majority said nothing about the
scope of commerce power over voluntary actors.278
In Lopez, the Court classified the mere possession of a firearm as
noneconomic just as clearly as the Morrison Court characterized
rape as noneconomic.279 If these firearms decisions—numbering in
the thousands280—are good law, then a jurisdictional element
establishes congressional authority over noneconomic as well as
economic activity. If a jurisdictional element does not authorize
federal prosecution of noneconomic crimes, thousands of people have
served hard time for conduct Congress has no power to regulate.281
The next Part proceeds on the theory that Lopez and Morrison
control. Even reading those cases fairly, Congress could reach many
rapes that make perverse use of “channels” or “facilities.”282 If the
Court is committed to sustaining the firearms cases, Congress
would also have jurisdiction over rapes involving articles that have
moved in commerce, including guns and condoms.283 Many rapes
occur on premises, or against victims, that Congress already
regulates under the substantial effects test.284 Congress, however,
still could not reach a great many rapes.285 Even under a robust
view of the commerce power, a significant residuum of exclusive
state authority would remain.
B. Congress Could Make Many Rapes Federal Crimes
Notwithstanding Lopez and Morrison, Congress has power under
the Commerce Clause to punish a great many rapes. Morrison
classified rape as noneconomic activity, but that classification only
277. See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 23-25 (2005).
278. See generally NFIB v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519 (2012).
279. Compare United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561 (1995) (“Section 922(q) is a crim-
inal statute that by its terms has nothing to do with ‘commerce’ or any sort of economic en-
terprise, however broadly one might define those terms.”), with United States v. Morrison, 529
U.S. 598, 613 (2000).
280. See RONALD J. FRANDSEN & MICHAEL N. BOWLING, REG’L JUSTICE INFO. SERV.,
FEDERAL FIREARMS CASES, FY2007, at 3-4 (2008), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/bjs/grants/
224890/pdf [https://perma.cc/BP4C-QHHG].
281. Cf. id.
282. See infra Part II.B.1.
283. See infra notes 310-16 and accompanying text.
284. See infra Part II.B.4.
285. See infra Part II.C.
1726 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 60:1685
matters under the third prong’s effects test.286 As Justice Scalia put
it, concurring in Raich, the first and second prongs “are self-evident,
since they are the ingredients of interstate commerce itself.”287
Congress has clear power to proscribe rapes committed by misusing
facilities or instrumentalities.288 Moreover, many rapes interfere
with economic activity that Congress can regulate under the third
prong.289
1. Channels and Facilities
Courts have held that both cellphone communications and the
Internet are channels or facilities of interstate or foreign com-
merce.290 Many rapists arrange to meet their victims using these
286. See Michele Martinez Campbell, The Kids Are Online: The Internet, the Commerce
Clause, and the Amended Federal Kidnapping Act, 14 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 215, 234-35 (2011)
(“Indisputably, modern Commerce Clause jurisprudence deals only with Lopez Third Category
‘substantially affects commerce’ statutes. In the years since Lopez, the Court has never had
occasion to address directly the constitutionality of any First or Second Category statute.
Nevertheless, as described above, clear language throughout the Lopez line of cases
distinguishes First and Second Category statutes and makes clear they are not implicated in
the economic/non-economic distinction created to resolve Third Category cases.”); see also
United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 589, 610-11 (2000).
287. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 34 (2005) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“[U]nlike the
channels, instrumentalities, and agents of interstate commerce, activities that substantially
affect interstate commerce are not themselves part of interstate commerce, and thus the
power to regulate them cannot come from the Commerce Clause alone.”).
288. See infra Parts II.B.1-3.
289. See infra Part II.B.4.
290. See, e.g., United States v. Barlow, 568 F.3d 215, 220-21 (5th Cir. 2009) (“In 2009, it
is beyond debate that the internet and email are facilities or means of interstate commerce.”);
United States v. Evans, 476 F.3d 1176, 1180-81 (11th Cir. 2007) (“Telephones and cellular
telephones are instrumentalities of interstate commerce. [Defendant’s] use of these
instrumentalities of interstate commerce alone, even without evidence that the calls he made
were routed through an interstate system, is sufficient to satisfy § 2422(b)’s interstate-
commerce element.” (internal citation omitted)); United States v. Gilbert, 181 F.3d 152, 158
(1st Cir. 1999) (upholding jurisdiction over bomb threat made by intrastate call (landline)
because “a telephone is an instrumentality of interstate commerce”); United States v.
Weathers, 169 F.3d 336, 341 (6th Cir. 1999) (“It is well established that telephones, even
when used intrastate, constitute instrumentalities of interstate commerce. Similarly, cellular
telephones, even in the absence of evidence that they were used to make interstate calls, have
been held to be instrumentalities of interstate commerce.” (internal citations and emphasis
omitted)); United States v. Clayton, 108 F.3d 1114, 1117 (9th Cir. 1997) (“Telephones are
instrumentalities of interstate commerce. As such, they fall under category two of Lopez, and
no further inquiry is necessary to determine that their regulation under 18 U.S.C. § 1029(a)
is within the Commerce Clause authority.” (internal citation omitted)).
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technologies.291 Congress’s power to punish use of these instrumen-
talities to commit fraud is unquestioned.292 Congress’s power to
punish their use to commit rape logically follows.
We have heard about some sensational cases—featuring the
“Craigslist rapist,”293 the “Christian Mingle rapist,”294 and so
on—but have no direct evidence of how many rapes involve misuse
of telecommunications. Predators who rape their victims while
meeting them for the first time online are of course subject to
federal jurisdiction.295 The met-on-the-net rapes, however, are likely
only a small minority of rapes facilitated by emails, text messages,
or phone calls.
One durable finding in the literature is that most victims know
their rapist.296 How many people do you know with whom you do not
exchange text messages, cell phone calls, or email? A high percent-
age of meetings that end in rape will be arranged through channels
of interstate commerce.297
Hotels and motels that cater to interstate travelers have long
been held subject to congressional jurisdiction under the third
291. See, e.g., William Lee, Match.com Assault Victim: ‘I Wasn’t Going to Let It Destroy My
Life’, CHI. TRIB. (June 7, 2016, 8:45 AM), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/ct-match-com-
victim-settlement-met-20160606-story.html [https://perma.cc/4G38-P5PM]; Naomi Martin,
Rapists Increasingly Using Dating Apps, Social Media to Lure Victims, Dallas Police Warn,
DALL. MORNING NEWS (Feb. 2016), https://www.dallasnews.com/news/crime/2016/02/01/
rapists-increasingly-using-dating-apps-social-media-to-lure-victims-dallas-police-warn
[https://perma.cc/FAM3-4ADR]; Rob McMillan, Barstow Man Suspected of Raping 2 Women
Met Through Online Dating Site, ABC7 NEWS (June 22, 2016), https://abc7.com/news/barstow-
man-suspected-of-raping-2-women-met-in-online-dating-site/1396993/ [https://perma.cc/5XV7-
PQPS].
292. See supra note 290 and accompanying text.
293. See Crimesider Staff, “Craigslist Rapist” Sentenced to 36 Years in Prison, CBS NEWS
(May 9, 2014, 4:11 PM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/craigslist-rapist-sentenced-to-36-
years-in-prison-in-illinois/ [https://perma.cc/LGG5-REP4].
294. See Jenny Kutner, Convicted Christian Mingle Rapist Recites Bible Verse to Victims:
“God Intended It for Good,” SALON (Nov. 10, 2014, 4:29 PM), https://www.salon.com/2014/11/
10/convicted_christian_mingle_rapist_recites_bible_verse_to_victims_god_intended_it_for_
good/ [https://perma.cc/Z64Y-3CAU].
295. See, e.g., Barlow, 568 F.3d at 220-21; sources cited supra note 290.
296. See, e.g., ERIKA HARRELL, BUREAU JUSTICE STATISTICS, VIOLENT VICTIMIZATION
COMMITTED BY STRANGERS, 1993-2010, at 2 tbl.1 (2012), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/
vvcs9310.pdf [https://perma.cc/PLA6-DUPR] (finding that in NCVS data for “rape/sexual
assault” for years 2005-2010, the victim was not acquainted with the offender in only 24.1
percent of cases). 
297. See sources cited supra note 290.
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prong’s effects test.298 Exploiting these facilities to commit sex
crimes also triggers congressional jurisdiction under the second
prong.299 The considerable number of rapes committed in rented
rooms could be prosecuted as federal crimes so long as the record
showed substantial use of the hotel by interstate travelers.300
2. “Instrumentalities”
Instrumentalities include the means of commerce and persons
moving in commerce.301 Any victim engaged in interstate travel can
claim the federal government’s protection.302 This includes tourists,
whether foreign or domestic, but it also includes many other
travelers.303 Business travelers are obviously in interstate com-
merce. Business travel covers travelers ranging from investment
bankers flying first class, to musicians, migrant farm workers, and
urban commuters.
Considerable authority treats vehicles as instrumentalities, even
when they are not traveling interstate at the time of the crime.304A
298. See Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 258-61 (1964).
299. See United States v. Phea, 755 F.3d 255, 258, 266 (5th Cir. 2014) (holding that in
prosecution for violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a), “telephones, the Internet, and hotels that
service interstate travelers are all means or facilities of interstate commerce sufficient to
establish the requisite interstate nexus”); Madkins v. United States, No. 3:11-cv-949-J-
34MCR, 2014 WL 4417849, at *19 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 8, 2014) (finding that in prosecution for
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1591, “the government produced abundant evidence establishing the
connection between Madkins’s activities and interstate commerce. The managers of several
of the hotels from which Madkins prostituted A.L. and M.M. testified that they derived
substantial business from interstate travelers.”).
300. See, e.g., Isabel Vincent, Rape and Drug Crimes Are on the Rise in Elite NYC Hotels,
N.Y. POST (Feb. 5, 2017, 1:46 PM), https://nypost.com/2017/02/05/rape-and-drug-crimes-are-
on-the-rise-in-elite-nyc-hotels/ [https://perma.cc/VBE5-U5N5]; see also Heart of Atlanta Motel,
Inc., 379 U.S. at 258-61.
301. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558 (1995).
302. See generally id.
303. See Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc., 379 U.S. at 261-62.
304. See United States v. Mandel, 647 F.3d 710, 722 (7th Cir. 2011) (“As applied to
Mandel’s intrastate use of his automobile, the statute does not plainly exceed the scope of
Congress’s Commerce Clause authority. Lopez recognizes that Congress may regulate the
facilities and instrumentalities of interstate commerce, ‘even though the threat may come only
from intrastate activities.’”); id. (reasoning that when “Congress elects to regulate under the
second prong of Lopez, ‘federal jurisdiction is supplied by the nature of the instrumentality
or facility used, not by separate proof of interstate movement.’” (quoting United States v.
Richeson, 338 F.3d 653, 660-61 (7th Cir. 2003)); United States v. Cobb, 144 F.3d 319, 322 (4th
Cir. 1998) (upholding a carjacking statute, and stating that “[u]ndoubtedly, if planes and
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rapist who exploits the victim’s car interferes with an instrumental-
ity.305 Rapists who use vehicles to reduce the visibility of the offense
exploit instrumentalities of commerce for criminal ends.306
3. Instrumentalities—Jurisdictional Elements
The firearms cases may be inconsistent with Lopez and Morrison,
because Lopez and Morrison treated jurisdictional elements as a
factor to be considered under the third prong’s substantial effects
test, rather than as a self-sufficient source of congressional power
under the second prong’s instrumentalities test.307 One can only
possess what one has acquired, and so regulating present possession
might be a way of regulating interstate acquisition. If, however,
jurisdictional elements are assimilated in that way into the third
prong, the characterization of possession as noneconomic is wrong.
Acquisition is quintessential economic activity. Given the millions
of Americans with felony records,308 a felon-in-possession law is
trains qualify as instrumentalities of interstate commerce, so too do automobiles. The fact
that not every car, train, or plane trip has an interstate destination has never been thought
to remove these means of transport from the category of an instrumentality of commerce”);
United States v. Bishop, 66 F.3d 569, 588 (3d Cir. 1995) (upholding a carjacking statute, and
stating that “[i]t would be anomalous ... to recognize these categories of instrumentalities
[that is, trains and planes] but to suggest that the similarly mobile automobile is not also an
instrumentality of interstate commerce”). For opposing views, see Garcia v. Vanguard Car
Rental USA, Inc., 540 F.3d 1242, 1249-50 (11th Cir. 2008) (upholding Graves Amendment
giving rental car companies immunity from vicarious liability under the third prong and
rejecting the second prong approach because viewing cars as instrumentalities would give
Congress “plenary power not only over the commercial rental car market, but over many
aspects of automobile use,” including traffic laws); Bishop, 66 F.3d at 598 (Becker, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“[A]irplanes and trains are, nearly exclusively,
used as instrumentalities of interstate commerce—that is, air and rail travel involves,
overwhelmingly, the sale of both inter- and intra-state transportation services for persons
and/or cargo. We do not deal here with the ability of Congress to regulate or protect intra- and
inter-state bus or commercial truck travel.... Rather, we deal here with a regulation governing
all automobiles in all instances.” (footnote omitted)).
305. Cf. Cobb, 144 F.3d at 322.
306. Cf. id.
307. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 613 (2000); United States v. Lopez, 514
U.S. 549, 559-61 (1995).
308. See Alan Flurry, Study Estimates U.S. Population with Felony Convictions, UGA
TODAY (Oct. 1, 2017), https://news.uga.edu/total-us-population-with-felony-convictions/ [https:
//perma.cc/Z7ML-DS66].
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bound to depress the demand and lower the price of guns in the
legal market.309
If Lopez did not undo Scarborough, proof that the crime involved
a gun that has moved in interstate commerce at any point in the
past justifies federal jurisdiction under the second prong.310 It would
seem to follow that any rape committed with the use of a gun that
has crossed state lines is likewise subject to federal jurisdiction. In
the NCVS data for 2005-2010, 6 percent of the reported crimes
involved a gun and another 4 percent involved a knife.311
Of course in rape cases, the police may not recover the weapon.312
Sometimes they will. However, the logic of the firearms cases
extends to any article that has passed through interstate commerce.
Many rapists use condoms,313 and courts have held that use of
condoms shipped interstate can establish a commerce nexus.314 In
many cases, physical evidence would not be required. The Trojan
brand dominates the U.S. market,315 and all Trojan products are
manufactured at a single plant in Virginia.316 Victim testimony to
the brand could establish interstate shipment outside Virginia.
309. Cf. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 19 (2005) (“Congress had a rational basis for
concluding that leaving home-consumed marijuana outside federal control would similarly
affect price and market conditions.” (emphasis added)). The same logic applies if “guns
possessed by felons” is substituted for “home-consumed marijuana.”
310. See Scarborough v. United States, 431 U.S. 563, 575 (1977).
311. See PLANTY ET AL., supra note 78, at 5 tbl.5.
312. See Ira Sommers & Deborah Baskin, The Influence of Forensic Evidence on the Case
Outcomes of Rape Incidents, 32 JUST. SYS. J. 314, 322-23 (2011) (noting that weapons are
rarely recovered in rape cases).
313. See Eryn Nicole O’Neal et al., Condom Use During Sexual Assault, 20 J. FORENSIC &
LEGAL MED. 605 (2013) (finding that condom prevalence rates in sexual assaults range from
11.7 percent to 15.6 percent).
314. See, e.g., United States v. Pipkins, 378 F.3d 1281, 1295 (11th Cir. 2004) (finding the
jurisdiction element of the RICO charge satisfied because, inter alia, “the pimps furnished
their prostitutes with condoms manufactured out of state, purchased from Atlanta gas
stations”), vacated on other grounds, 544 U.S. 902 (2005); United States v. Powell, No. 04 CR
885, 2006 WL 1155947, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 28, 2006) (“According to the government, Powell
used telephones to keep in contact with his victims while they worked the streets, and
supplied them with out-of-state condoms. Accordingly, his alleged conduct substantially
affected interstate commerce.”).
315. See Robert Klara, For Trojan, Inventive Packaging Made the Sale When Advertising
Wasn’t Allowed, ADWEEK (Dec. 27, 2016), https://www.adweek.com/brand-marketing/trojan-
inventive-packaging-made-sale-when-advertising-wasnt-allowed-175213/ [https://perma.cc/
2WZB-DWZR] (noting that Trojan may hold over 72 percent of the market share).
316. Virginia Plant to be Sole Source of Trojan Condoms, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Feb. 7, 1996),
https://apnews.com/02174dd7c6a6a71c0545967582fa2b60 [https://perma.cc/YRM6-U426].
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4. Substantial Effects
As helpfully distilled by more than one circuit court, Morrison
announced a four-factor test for when the government must rely on
the third prong to sustain a federal criminal statute:
In order to determine whether a statute is unconstitutional
because it exceeds Congress’s Commerce Clause power, we must
consider four issues: (1) whether the prohibited activity is
commercial or economic in nature; (2) whether there is an
express jurisdictional element involving interstate activity
which might limit the statute’s reach; (3) whether Congress
made findings about the effects of the prohibited conduct on
interstate commerce; and (4) whether the link between the
prohibited activity and the effect on interstate commerce is
attenuated.317
Morrison itself defined attenuation functionally as a requirement of
a significant residuum of exclusive state authority.318
Congress need not assert plenary power under the third prong to
subject a significant number of rapes to federal liability. Items (2)
and (3) are within the control of Congress.319 In what follows, I shall
assume that Congress would include a jurisdictional element and
make appropriate legislative findings.
Respecting rapes in two commercial contexts, the law is already
clear. First, Congress has power to regulate rape at the workplace
under Title VII.320 Second, coerced participation in commercial sex
is subject to Commerce Clause regulation via the third prong,
sustaining the Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of
317. See United States v. Ray, 189 F. App’x 436, 447 (6th Cir. 2006).
318. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 612-13 (2000) (deriving attenuation from
Lopez where the Court rejected the government’s cost-of-crime effects arguments “because
they would permit Congress to ‘regulate not only all violent crime, but all activities that might
lead to violent crime, regardless of how tenuously they relate to interstate commerce’”
(quoting United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 564 (2000))); Bradley, supra note 240, at 578
(“Since almost everything, or some of its components, has moved in interstate commerce at
some point, mere past movement in interstate commerce, unconnected to the instant crime,
would not seem to satisfy the ‘non-infinity’ principle that Lopez was announcing.”).
319. See Ray, 189 F. App’x at 447.
320. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2012) (prohibiting discriminatory practices in the workplace on
the basis of sex).
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2000 (TUPA) and its predecessors.321 It follows that rape at the
workplace, or of sex workers, is within the commerce power under
the third prong.
a. Workplace Rapes
Many federal statutes regulate intrastate employment on the
basis of the third prong. Examples include the Occupational Health
and Safety Act322 and the Fair Labor Standards Act.323 Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act is also based on the commerce power.324 The law
is clear that rape in the employment environment can create
employer liability.325 If Congress has power to hold employers
accountable for workplace rapes, Congress has power to hold
workplace rapists accountable.
The number of these assaults is significant. Working with four
years of NCVS data, from 2005 to 2009, the BJS estimated the rate
of sexual assault victimization of employees at work at 0.1 percent
per one thousand people, 0.6 per one thousand people for employed
persons not at work, and 1 per one thousand people for unemployed
persons.326 If that is correct,327 one in seventeen—more than 5
percent—of all sexual assaults occurs at the workplace.328 Working
321. Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-386, 114
Stat. 1464 (codified as amended in scattered titles of the United States Code).
322. 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (2012).
323. Id. §§ 201-219.
324. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2.
325. See Lapka v. Chertoff, 517 F.3d 974, 982-83 (7th Cir. 2008) (“It goes without saying
that forcible rape is ‘unwelcome physical conduct of a sexual nature.’ Rape is also, by
definition, a form of harassment based on sex.” (internal citation omitted)); Ferris v. Delta Air
Lines, Inc., 277 F.3d 128, 136 (2d Cir. 2001) (“Although a continuing pattern of hostile or
abusive behavior is ordinarily required to establish a hostile environment, a single instance
can suffice when it is sufficiently egregious. We have no doubt a single incident of rape can
satisfy the first prong of employer liability under a hostile work environment theory.”); Little
v. Windermere Relocation, Inc., 301 F.3d 958, 967 (9th Cir. 2001) (“Rape is unquestionably
among the most severe forms of sexual harassment.”); Watkins v. Prof’l Sec. Bureau, Ltd., 201
F.3d 439 (4th Cir. 1999). 
326. ERIKA HARRELL, BUREAU JUSTICE STATISTICS, WORKPLACE VIOLENCE, 1993-2009, at
3 tbl.1 (2011), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/wv09.pdf [https://perma.cc/86AS-J8X3].
327. The NCVS data on rape are imperfect: it might be that respondents are more willing
to report workplace than household rapes when responding to a household survey. On the
other hand, respondents might feel less inclined to protect a coworker as opposed to a family
member.
328. See HARRELL, supra note 326, at 3 tbl.1.
2019] WHY RAPE SHOULD BE A FEDERAL CRIME 1733
with sixteen years of data, another BJS report estimated that rapes
at work account for 9 to 12 percent of all victimizations, depending
on the years selected.329 
Still more rapes occur while the victim is in transit to or from the
workplace. The BJS college-age female survey found that 10 percent
of student rapes, and 16 percent of nonstudent rapes, occurred while
the victim was “[w]orking or traveling to work.”330 The true percent-
age of rape at work must be substantial, whatever the precise
number turns out to be.
b. Rapes of Sex Workers
In Taylor v. United States, the Court held that an illegal market
still counts as commerce.331 Lower courts have upheld the TUPA
because commercial sex is economic activity with a substantial,
direct effect on interstate commerce.332 Given the aggregate effect on
commerce, the commerce nexus required to satisfy the statutory
jurisdictional element in any single case need be no more than de
minimis, just as under the Hobbs Act.333
Sex workers are frequent victims of rape. In one survey of sex
workers, 68 percent of the respondents reported being raped.334 If
commercial sex is an economic activity that in the aggregate has
substantial effects on commerce,335 Congress can regulate this
subterranean market by protecting sex workers against rape.
c. Use of Date-Rape Drugs
Without requiring proof of a jurisdictional element, the CSA
makes simple possession of the date rape drug flunitrazepam a
329. See PLANTY ET AL., supra note 78, at 4 tbl.2. 
330. SINOZICH & LANGTON, supra note 114, at 6 tbl.4. The n for students raped at work or
en route to or from work was at most ten, and the BJS advises interpreting the 10 percent
figure with caution. Id.
331. 136 S. Ct. 2074, 2081-82 (2016).
332. See, e.g., United States v. Baston, 818 F.3d 651, 665 (11th Cir. 2016); United States
v. Evans, 476 F.3d 1176, 1179-80 (11th Cir. 2007).
333. See Taylor, 136 S. Ct. at 2077-78, 2081.
334. Melissa Farley & Howard Barkan, Prostitution, Violence, and Posttraumatic Stress
Disorder, 27 WOMEN & HEALTH, no. 3, 1998, at 37, 45. 
335. See, e.g., Evans, 476 F.3d at 1179-80.
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federal crime.336 The CSA further provides, again without a
jurisdictional element, a maximum twenty-year sentence for the
surreptitious administration of any controlled substance with intent
to commit, among other things, rape.337 Congressional power to
punish attempted rapes by means of controlled substances logically
extends to punishing completed offenses.
C. The Commerce Power Does Not Reach Many Other Rapes
Despite the many rapes the commerce power might reach, it
clearly cannot reach a great many other rapes. Where the rapist,
without prior communications, attacks the victim in private
premises or in public space, the government cannot prove use of a
weapon, condom, or other instrumentality of commerce, and neither
victim nor rapist is an interstate traveler, there is no plausible basis
of Commerce Clause jurisdiction.338 Infamous examples include the
“Central Park jogger” case and the William Kennedy Smith case. In
the former, the rapist tackled and viciously beat the victim in
Central Park.339 In the latter, the defendant was accused of
attacking the victim during a walk on the beach.340
336. 21 U.S.C. § 844(a) (2012) (“Notwithstanding any penalty provided in this subsection,
any person convicted under this subsection for the possession of flunitrazepam shall be
imprisoned for not more than 3 years, shall be fined as otherwise provided in this section, or
both.”).
337. Id. § 841(b)(7).
338. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558 (1995) (“[N]either here nor in Wickard
has the Court declared that Congress may use a relatively trivial impact on commerce as an
excuse for broad general regulation of ... private activities.” (quoting Maryland v. Wirtz, 392
U.S. 183, 197 n.27 (1968))).
339. For a summary of the case, including the exoneration of those initially convicted for
the attack, see, for example, Jill Filipovic, The Painful Lessons of the Central Park Five and
the Jogger Rape Case, GUARDIAN (Oct. 5, 2012, 5:32 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/
commentisfree/2012/oct/05/central-park-five-rape-case [https://perma.cc/T7M7-RQ44].
340. See This Day in History: December 02, 1991: Kennedy Cousin Rape Trial Begins, HIST.
CHANNEL, https://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/kennedy-cousin-rape-trial-begins [https
://perma.cc/SX4S-RRM5].
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The most common location for rapes is the victim’s home.341
Although many rapes involve telecommunications, weapons, or
condoms, many others do not.342 Some examples of charged rape of
a housemate, without report of a weapon or condom, are familiar
from standard criminal law casebooks. In Commonwealth v. Berk-
owitz, the prosecution charged the defendant, a college student, who
raped another student while she was visiting his dorm room.343 The
charge in Commonwealth v. Mlinarich was rape of defendant’s live-
in ward.344 In re M.T.S. involved an alleged rape committed by one
juvenile of another juvenile residing at the same house.345
The government, moreover, must prove jurisdictional elements
beyond a reasonable doubt.346 The precise scope of exclusive state
authority over rape is impossible to quantify. Nonetheless, it seems
safe to say that more exclusive state authority would remain over
rape than the Hobbs Act leaves the states for robbery.347
III. THE DUAL CASE FOR A FEDERAL LAW AGAINST RAPE
A. Improving the Investigation and Prosecution of Rape
1. Logistics: Quantity and Quality
If federal jurisdiction did not improve rape enforcement, its
constitutionality would be of only academic interest. The truth is
that federal enforcement would bring major advantages to the
341. See PLANTY ET AL., supra note 78, at 4 (“Over all three periods, between 41 [percent]
and 48 [percent] of victims of sexual violence were undertaking activities at or around their
homes at the time of the incident.”); SINOZICH & LANGTON, supra note 114, at 6 tbl.4 (finding
that 31 percent of student rapes and 50 percent of nonstudent rapes took place while the
victim was sleeping or engaged in other home activities). 
342. See, e.g., SINOZICH & LANGTON, supra note 114, at 7 (finding that the offender used a
weapon in only one in ten rapes and sexual assaults between 1995 and 2013).
343. 641 A.2d 1161, 1163 (Pa. 1994). 
344. 542 A.2d 1335, 1336 (Pa. 1988). 
345. 609 A.2d 1266, 1267 (N.J. 1992). 
346. See Margaret H. Lemos, The Commerce Power and Criminal Punishment: Presumption
of Constitutionality or Presumption of Innocence?, 84 TEX. L. REV. 1203, 1205-06 (2006).
347. Cf. United States v. Rivera-Rivera, 555 F.3d 277, 298 (1st Cir. 2009) (Lipez, J., dis-
senting) (suggesting “we risk turning every routine robbery into a federal offense” under the
majority’s analysis, under the Hobbs Act because the nexus between the robbery and in-
terstate commerce is too attenuated).
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prosecution of sexual assault.348 The first of these is logistical.
Federal officials have discretion over their own caseload349 and are
backed with more resources per case than state and local law
enforcement.350
As Professor Stuntz put it, “[t]hanks to more generous per-case
funding than local governments can afford, the key actors in the
federal justice system enjoy a measure of slack.”351 This in turn
means that the federal government can offer agents and lawyers
better salaries and more upward mobility to work on more promis-
ing cases.352 Economics 101 predicts that more talented, better
credentialed, and generally more effective people would gravitate to
federal as opposed to state law enforcement. There are many superb
state and local law enforcement officers, from cops on the beat to
State Attorneys General. It is still fair to say that federal officers
are America’s law enforcement A Team.353
A study released in 2008 of federal prosecutions under the TVPA
suggests the potential effectiveness of federal rape prosecutions.354
TVPA cases present some of the same challenges faced by rape
prosecutions. These challenges include obtaining cooperation from
victims355 and overcoming skepticism by law enforcement officers.356
348. See generally John C. Jeffries, Jr. & John Gleeson, The Federalization of Organized
Crime: Advantages of Federal Prosecution, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 1095 (1995) (discussing ad-
vantages that federal prosecutors enjoy over state and local prosecutors).
349. Id. at 1100 (“Beyond responding to obvious local needs and servicing federal law
enforcement, [U.S.] Attorneys have substantial discretion to direct their energies where they
see fit.”).
350. See WILLIAM J. STUNTZ, THE COLLAPSE OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 66 (2011)
(“[L]ocal police and local prosecutors handle fourteen times as many felony cases as does the
federal government, and several hundred times the number of misdemeanors. Yet the ratio
of local cops to federal officers is only 6 to 1, and the ratio of local prosecutors to their federal
counterparts is less than 5 to 1.”).
351. Id. 
352. See Jeffries & Gleeson, supra note 348, at 1098-1101; Occupational Outlook Handbook:
Lawyers: Pay, BUREAU LABOR STATISTICS, https://www.bls.gov/ooh/legal/lawyers.htm#tab-5
[https://perma.cc/Z9B9-SVLU] (noting that in May 2017, federal government lawyers earned
a median salary of $141,900—higher than the $93,020 earned by local government attorneys
and $85,260 earned by state government attorneys).
353. See, e.g., Weiser, supra note 34.
354. See HEATHER J. CLAWSON ET AL., ICF INT’L, PROSECUTING HUMAN TRAFFICKING CASES:
LESSONS LEARNED AND PROMISING PRACTICES, at viii (2008), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/
nij/grants/223972.pdf [https://perma.cc/VJT5LCPX]. 
355. Id. at vi (“Prosecutors noted that these cases require a greater concern for victims and
their needs by the prosecution than with other cases. While a challenge, this was also viewed
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Yet TVPA prosecutions resulted in a high rate of convictions.357 Only
3 percent were dismissed and 1 percent ended in acquittals.358 TVPA
cases also differ in many ways from rape cases,359 but the TVPA
record suggests the potential power of federal intervention.
2. Tactics: Federal Procedural Advantages in Sexual Assault
Cases
Federal law enforcement assets can make a difference wherever
they are deployed. Four special features of federal criminal practice
make that difference especially promising in sexual assault cases.
These are the dual-sovereignty doctrine,360 grand jury secrecy,361
admissibility of propensity evidence,362 and generally more punitive
sentences.363
Consider, first, cases that arise in the state systems. The ultimate
rationalization for not pursuing rape cases is the apprehension that
the jury will acquit against the evidence.364 Today there is no appeal
from such a verdict, no matter how irrational.365 The dual-sover-
eignty doctrine treats conduct violating both federal and state law
as critical as these cases were described as victim-dependent.”); id. (“Half of the prosecutors
interviewed indicated that a case is rarely successfully without victim cooperation and
testimony.”).
356. Id. at vii (“Specifically, prosecutors called for greater buy-in and dedicated law
enforcement to investigate these crimes. Prosecutors noted an unwillingness at times of law
enforcement in dealing with these cases as well as seeing a victim as a human trafficking
victim.”).
357. Id. at iii (“Seventy-seven percent resulted in guilty dispositions.”).
358. Id. (“Three percent of the cases resulted in dismissals and 8 percent are pending. Less
than 1 percent of the cases resulted in acquittals.”).
359. See, e.g., SHARED HOPE INT’L, CHILD SEX TRAFFICKING IS DISTINCT FROM STATUTORY
RAPE: THE CRITICAL IMPORTANCE OF USING SEX TRAFFICKING LAWS TO COMBAT CHILD SEX
TRAFFICKING CRIMES (2017), https://sharedhope.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/Importance-
of-Using-CST-Laws-over-Stat-Rape-Laws.pdf [https://perma.cc/NW5B-DQH8].
360. See infra notes 366-69, 376-79 and accompanying text.
361. See generally Richard M. Calkins, Grand Jury Secrecy, 63 MICH. L. REV. 455 (1965);
infra note 368 and accompanying text.
362. See generally Rice Lave & Orenstein, supra note 99; infra notes 365-67 and accom-
panying text.
363. See generally Wright, supra note 35; infra notes 373-75 and accompanying text.
364. See Sherry F. Colb, A Fresh Look at Jury Nullification, JUSTIA (May 18, 2017), https://
verdict.justia.com/2017/05/18/fresh-look-jury-nullification [https://perma.cc/GC53-V9G3].
365. See Andrew D. Leipold, Rethinking Jury Nullification, 82 VA. L. REV. 253, 266-68
(1996).
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as two offenses rather than “the same offense.”366 This permits
federal retrials after state acquittals and vice versa.367 If rape were
a federal crime, state prosecutors who felt the jury had made a
grievous error could ask the U.S. Attorney’s Office to consider the
case. The federal prosecutors would have the transcript of the state
trial, and they could call witnesses—including the complaining
witness—to testify in secrecy before the grand jury to rebut ex-
culpatory testimony from the defense.368 At a federal trial, the
defendant’s testimony at the state trial would be admissible against
him at the federal trial as a party-opponent statement.369
Under Federal Rule of Evidence 413, the federal prosecutors could
introduce proof of prior similar acts of sexual assault, whether
proved by conviction or supported only by the testimony of wit-
nesses.370 Some, but only some, states have the same rule.371 The
empirical evidence suggests that the effect on juries of other crimes
evidence is significant, at least in borderline cases.372
366. The seminal case is United States v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 377 (1922). See id. at 382 (“[A]n
act denounced as a crime by both national and state sovereignties is an offense against the
peace and dignity of both and may be punished by each.”).
367. See, e.g., Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 87-88 (1996) (concerning a sentencing
appeal by police officers acquitted on state charges but convicted on federal charges for the
beating of Rodney King). 
368. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(2) (setting forth the federal rule on grand jury secrecy). 
369. See FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(A). 
370. See FED. R. EVID. 413(a).
371. See Jessica D. Khan, He Said, She Said, She Said: Why Pennsylvania Should Adopt
Federal Rules of Evidence 413 and 414, 52 VILL. L. REV. 641, 645-46 (2007) (“Since the
enactment of these federal rules, ten states have adopted versions of them .... In addition, at
least nine states have common law exceptions that admit propensity evidence in sex crimes
cases.”). 
372. See Theodore Eisenberg & Valerie P. Hans, Taking a Stand on Taking the Stand: The
Effect of a Prior Criminal Record on the Decision to Testify and on Trial Outcomes, 94
CORNELL L. REV. 1353, 1382-83 (2009) (finding that, in an empirical study of actual jury trials,
controlling for the strength of the case, “[t]he most striking conviction rate is for cases with
evidence strength equal to three in which the jury learned about a criminal record. Despite
the relatively weak evidence, the conviction rate exceeded 60 [percent], far greater than the
rate for cases with evidentiary strength equal to three in which the jury did not learn about
a criminal record, and far greater than the conviction rate for evidentiary strength equal to
two.”). Eisenberg and Hans studied admission of prior convictions to impeach. See id. at 1354-
57. One would expect to see stronger effects from other acts admitted to show propensity, but
also weaker effects for other acts proved by disputed testimony rather than by prior
conviction. Cf. id. at 1366.
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If convicted at a federal retrial, the defendant would be sentenced
under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines.373 For violation of the
federal aggravated sexual abuse statute—the federal version of
forcible rape—the base offense level is 30, with an automatic in-
crease of 4, for a base offense level of 34.374 For defendants with no
or trivial criminal history, and no adjustments or departures, the
Guidelines prescribe a sentence of 151 to 188 months for base
offense level 34.375
The prospect of federal retrials could also transform plea
bargaining in rape cases in the state courts. The defense attorney
calculating a likely acquittal in the common forcible-rape-of-an-
acquaintance case would have to factor in the prospect that winning
a jury verdict in state court might land the defendant in federal
prison for fifteen years.376 It would probably take a few federal trials
to convey the message, but federal heat could deliver a lot of bang
for the buck. That prospect, in turn, might reenergize state police
and prosecutors long frustrated by the difficulty of winning con-
victions in state court.377
The Court is reconsidering the dual sovereigns doctrine in a
pending case, Gamble v. United States.378 The Court may reaffirm
current doctrine. Even without the dual-sovereigns doctrine, some
follow-on federal prosecution might still be possible under the same-
elements test of “the same offense.”379 If the Court decides Gamble
373. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2016).
374. See id. § 2A3.1(a)-(b). Section 2A3.1(a)(1) provides a base offense level of 38 for
violations of 18 U.S.C. § 2241(c), applicable to underage victims. Id. § 2A3.1(a)(1). Guideline
§ 2A3.1(a)(2) then gives a base offense level of “30, otherwise.” Id. § 2A3.1(a)(2). But
§ 2A3.1(b)(1) provides immediately thereafter: “If the offense involved conduct described in
18 U.S.C. § 2241(a) or (b), increase by 4 levels.” Id. § 2A3.1(b)(1). The circumlocution
notwithstanding, it seems clear that a defendant convicted for forcible sexual assault on an
adult victim in federal court would start the sentencing process at level 34. See id. § 2A3.1(a)-
(b).
375. See id. ch.5, pt.A, sentencing tbl.
376. See supra notes 373-75 and accompanying text.
377. Cf. supra notes 175-77 and accompanying text.
378. 694 F. App’x 750 (11th Cir. 2017), cert. granted, 138 S. Ct. 2707 (2018).
379. See United States v. Hairston, 64 F.3d 491, 496 (9th Cir. 1995) (rejecting Gibson
because “Congress may have strong interests in treating crimes occurring within the
jurisdiction of the United States differently”); United States v. Gibson, 820 F.2d 692, 698 (5th
Cir. 1987) (holding that when the only difference between two crimes is a jurisdictional el-
ement those crimes are “the same offense”). Even if jurisdictional elements differentiate
offenses for double-jeopardy purposes, a follow-on federal charge would be barred unless the
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in a way that permits federal prosecutions only when the federal
authorities initiate the case, a federal rape statute still would have
powerful incentives effects.
Consider the complaints turned away by local police or district
attorney’s offices.380 Once rape becomes a federal crime, advocates
at rape crisis centers could inform survivors of this additional re-
porting possibility. Federal prosecutions following state declinations
would likely attract publicity, even if unsuccessful. Given the fed-
eral advantages in trial procedures and plea bargaining leverage,
there is some reason to expect success even in cases state au-
thorities see as unpromising.381 Further, the prospect of being em-
barrassed by successful prosecution of declined complaints might
motivate the state authorities to take more complaints more seri-
ously.
B. Drawing Federal Resources Away from Fringe Enforcement of
Proxy Crimes
Committing federal resources to rape enforcement will draw those
resources away from other priorities. That is a feature, not a bug.
Counterterrorism, counterespionage, murder-for-hire, and some
organized crime cases deserve priority over rape prosecutions.382 The
government, however, devotes only a small percentage of its pros-
ecutional assets to these high priorities.383
The U.S. Sentencing Commission keeps statistics on the offenses
for which district courts sentence convicted defendants.384 In fiscal
year 2015, the largest single category of federal sentences was for
state charge included some element that the federal charge does not. See id. For example, if
the state prosecution was for “aggravated sexual assault” because a gun was used or the
victim suffered injuries other than the sexual assault itself, then a federal prosecution under
a statute with a jurisdictional element but not required proof of a weapon or additional
injuries would be permissible under the Hairston approach.
380. See supra Part I.B.2-3.
381. See supra notes 366-72 and accompanying text.
382. See What We Investigate, FED. BUREAU INVESTIGATION, https://www.fbi.gov/investigate
[https://perma.cc/3X7F-U7A8] (listing terrorism as the FBI’s “top investigative priority”).
383. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, FIGURE A: OFFENDERS IN EACH PRIMARY OFFENSE
CATEGORY, FISCAL YEAR 2015 (2015), https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-
and-publications/annual-reports-and-sourcebooks/2015/FigureA.pdf [https://perma. cc/Q3S8-
EQE5] (showing that the majority of federal prosecution efforts go to drugs and immigration).
384. See id.
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drug offenses, 31.8 percent of the total.385 Immigration offenses ran
a close second, at 29.3 percent.386 The remaining categories are
fraud (10.5 percent), firearms (10 percent), nonfraud white collar
(3.2 percent), child pornography (2.7 percent), and larceny (1.3 per-
cent).387 The percentage of violent crimes is too small to report inde-
pendently.388 Instead, violent crimes are counted under the catchall
“other” offenses category, which includes everything from murder-
for-hire to obstruction of justice.389
The U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) section of
the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has primary
responsibility for investigating criminal violations of immigration
laws.390 DOJ prosecutes these immigration crimes.391 So assigning
responsibility for rape enforcement to DOJ would not draw investi-
gative assets (for example, agents) away from immigration, but it
might draw some prosecutorial resources from all offense categories.
Courts imposed 41.8 percent of all federal sentences for posses-
sory crimes involving drugs or firearms.392 These laws treat pos-
session as a predictor of future harm.393 Earlier intervention can
prevent more crimes, while prosecutors can prove possessory crimes
via the arresting officer’s testimony.394 The downside is that most
people who commit possessory crimes will never cause the harms
these laws were intended to prevent.395 A great many ambiguously
385. Id.
386. Id.
387. Id.
388. See id.
389. See id.
390. See What We Do, U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, https://www.ice.gov/over
view [https://perma.cc/8ZL8-TRRS].
391. See Jeff Sessions, Introduction: Prosecuting Criminal Immigration Offenses, U.S.
ATT’YS BULL., July 2017, at 1, 1.
392. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 383.
393. See, e.g., New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 759-61 (1982).
394. See Markus Dirk Dubber, Policing Possession: The War on Crime and the End of
Criminal Law, 91 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 829, 858-62 (2001).
395. See, e.g., Larry Alexander & Kimberly Kessler Ferzan, Culpable Acts of Risk Creation,
5 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 375, 391 n.36 (2008) (“Sometimes the criminal law seeks to punish acts
that do not risk harm in themselves. These sorts of acts are ‘proxy crimes.’ There are two
types of proxy crimes-crimes that set forth a rule that is overinclusive (e.g., speed limits, ages
of consent), and crimes that punish actions that are not culpable for law enforcement reasons
(e.g., possession of burglar’s tools). The former presents a rules/standards problem. In setting
forth the rule, the crime is overinclusive, thereby punishing actions that are not themselves
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culpable and contingently dangerous people are punished in the
process.396
The government’s annual National Survey on Drug Use and
Health for 2015 estimated that 27.1 million Americans over age
twelve were regular users of some illicit drug, including 22.2 million
regular marijuana users, 1.9 million cocaine users (inclusive of
crack), 900,000 regular meth users, and 300,000 regular heroin
users.397 Even if we focus just on hard drugs (which federal enforce-
ment does not),398 it must take hundreds of millions of drug deals,
wholesale and retail, to satisfy this market.
Federal marijuana cases remain common. In the year ending
March 2016, federal prosecutors brought marijuana charges against
5347 defendants.399 Of these, 2188 prosecutions were for possession
and 2671 for distribution.400 There were only 450 importation
prosecutions and 38 manufacturing prosecutions.401 We can assume
that many of the possession cases were plea deals,402 but we can al-
so assume that not all the distribution or manufacturing charges
were brought against major traffickers or producers.403 Even the
largest dealers, moreover, sell marijuana that is no more dangerous
than that sold by others. For the year ending in March 2017, the
latest statistics show a continuing commitment to marijuana
culpable. The latter type of proxy crime is even more objectionable because all instances of the
conduct are themselves innocent.”).
396. See Dubber, supra note 394, at 836 (arguing that possession offenses “break virtually
every law in the book of cherished criminal law principles”).
397. See U.S. SUBSTANCE ABUSE & MENTAL HEALTH SERVS. ADMIN., KEY SUBSTANCE USE
AND MENTAL HEALTH INDICATORS IN THE UNITED STATES: RESULTS FROM THE 2015 NATIONAL
SURVEY ON DRUG USE AND HEALTH 7 fig.1 (2016), https://www.samhsa.gov/data/sites/default/
files/NSDUH-FFR1-2015/NSDUH-FFR1-2015/NSDUH-FFR1-2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/PY24-
ZCQY].
398. See id.
399. See ADMIN. OFFICE U.S. COURTS, TABLE D-2: U.S. DISTRICT COURTS—CRIMINAL DEFEN-
DANTS COMMENCED, BY OFFENSE, DURING THE 12-MONTH PERIODS ENDING MARCH 31, 2012
THROUGH 2016, at 2 (2016), http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/data_tables/fjcs_d2_
0331.2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/D78A-GVNU].
400. Id. 
401. Id. 
402. See generally HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, AN OFFER YOU CAN’T REFUSE: HOW US FEDERAL
PROSECUTORS FORCE DRUG DEFENDANTS TO PLEAD GUILTY (2013), https://www.hrw.org/
report/2013/12/05/offer-you-cant-refuse/how-us-federal-prosecutors-force-drug-defendants-
plead [https://perma.cc/BR5H-CKRJ].
403. See, e.g., id. at 4.
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cases—resulting in 4580 prosecutions without breaking down the
categories of possession, trafficking, and manufacturing cases.404
If there are 300,000 regular heroin users, and each buys heroin
three times a week (a conservative estimate),405 there would be more
than 46 million sales per year, just to consumers. The CDC reports
that in 2016, 15,500 people died from heroin overdoses.406 Based on
those numbers, any given retail heroin sale has a 1 in 2975 chance
of leading to a fatal overdose.407 Moreover, enforcement is likely to
have a limited effect on supply. Arrested drug dealers are quickly
replaced.408
In stark contrast to drug deals, every rape inflicts grievous
harm.409 There is no demand for rapists as there is for drug
dealers.410 Recalling that most rapists are serial rapists,411 the crime
control benefits of convicting rapists are demonstrably greater than
the benefits of convicting retail drug dealers.
The frequency of illegal gun possession is hard to estimate. The
BJS does not even give a figure for the total number of persons with
felony convictions, instead offering the proxy that “more than 5.6
million U.S. adult residents, or about 1 in 37 U.S. adults, ha[ve]
served time in state or federal prison.”412 A high percentage of
404. See ADMIN. OFFICE U.S. COURTS, TABLE D-3: U.S. DISTRICT COURTS—CRIMINAL DEFEN-
DANTS COMMENCED, BY OFFENSE AND DISTRICT, DURING THE 12-MONTH PERIOD ENDING MARCH
31, 2017, at 2 (2017), http://www.uscourts.gov/statistics/table/d-3/federal-judicial-caseload-
statistics/2017/03/31 [https://perma.cc/8H7E-4BEG].
405. See Eric E. Sterling, Drug Policy: A Smorgasbord of Conundrums Spiced by Emotions
Around Children and Violence, 31 VAL. U. L. REV. 597, 610 (1997) (“While a marijuana smoker
might buy pot weekly or several times monthly, or a heroin user might buy heroin once or
twice a day, a crack user might buy crack five times in a day.”).
406. See Heroin Overdose Data, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, https://www.
cdc.gov/drugoverdose/data/heroin.html [https://perma.cc/7B4Z-YY5P] (last updated Jan. 26,
2017).
407. Cf. id.
408. See Philip J. Cook, The Demand and Supply of Criminal Opportunities, in 7 CRIME
AND JUSTICE 1, 22 (Michael Tonry & Norval Morris eds., 1986).
409. See Effects of Sexual Violence, RAPE, ABUSE & INCEST NAT’L NETWORK, https://www.
rainn.org/effects-sexual-violence [https://perma.cc/K5VL-ASXX].
410. See Cook, supra note 408, at 22 (“My intuition is that there will be little or no
replacement if child abusers or drunk drivers are reformed or restrained and that
replacement will be near complete in the case of street-level sellers of illicit commodities.”).
411. See Lisak & Miller, supra note 142, at 78.
412. FAQ Detail: How Many Persons in the U.S. Have Ever Been Convicted of a Felony?,
BUREAU JUST. STAT., https://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=qa&iid=404 [https://perma.cc/RVC7-
P5U8] [hereinafter FAQ Detail].
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convicted felons, however, are not sentenced to prison (almost one-
third, according to one BJS survey),413 although many of these peo-
ple will be incarcerated after probation violations.414 If we add to the
felons those convicted of misdemeanor domestic violence, made fel-
ons by the Lautenberg Amendment if they possess guns,415 the num-
ber of people subject to federal criminal liability for possessing a gun
is still higher.
How many of these ineligible persons obtain guns against the law
is a matter of conjecture. In one survey of prison inmates, over half
of the respondents reported committing a gun offense other than an
armed crime.416 There are obvious methodological issues, but those
could cut in different directions.417 Given the dangerous milieu in
which most violent criminals live, the percentage is likely to be high
even among felons with no plans to commit crimes extrinsic to the
gun possession.418
In 2015, the FBI reported 9616 murders committed with fire-
arms.419 On the assumption that 50 percent of 5.6 million felons
have guns,420 that would be one gun murder for every 2082 felons in
possession. The 5.6 million is a major undercount, as it excludes
nonincarcerated felons and misdemeanor violence offenders.421 Some
firearm homicides, moreover, are not committed by adjudicated
felons.
The issue is not whether the federal government should punish
some possessory crimes, but what priority those crimes deserve
413. SEAN ROSENMERKEL ET AL., BUREAU JUST. STATISTICS, FELONY SENTENCES IN STATE
COURTS, 2006—STATISTICAL TABLES 2 (rev. ed. 2010), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/fssc
06st.pdf [https://perma.cc/5ULM-GJER] (finding that 27 percent of state felony convicts were
sentenced to probation and 4 percent were sentenced to neither prison nor probation).
414. See, e.g., Wendy Sawyer & Wanda Bertram, New Reports Show Probation Is Down,
But Still a Major Driver of Incarceration, PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE (Apr. 26, 2018), https://
www.prisonpolicy.org/blog/2018/04/26/probation_update-2/ [https://perma.cc/7XBK-DL5R].
415. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9) (2012). 
416. JAMES D. WRIGHT & PETER H. ROSSI, ARMED AND CONSIDERED DANGEROUS: A SURVEY
OF FELONS AND THEIR FIREARMS 87 (1986). 
417. See id. at 83, 89.
418. See id. at 43.
419. Expanded Homicide Data Table 8: Murder Victims by Weapon, 2011-2015, FED.
BUREAU INVESTIGATION, https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/2015/crime-in-the-u.s.-2015/tables/
expanded_homicide_data_table_8_murder_victims_by_weapon_2011-2015.xls [https://perma.
cc/4P5A-ZQUL].
420. See FAQ Detail, supra note 412.
421. See supra text accompanying notes 413-15.
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relative to forcible rape complaints that may go nowhere in the state
systems.422 Perhaps punishing the worst possessory offenders de-
serves priority over punishing forcible rapists. It is beyond belief
that punishing the least aggravated cases deserves that priority.
C. Compared to Rape?
Susan Klein and Ingrid Grobey aggregated state and federal
felony convictions and found that federal courts returned 5 to 6
percent of all felony convictions.423 The federal share, however, is
not evenly distributed across offense categories.424 For the calendar
year 2006, Klein and Grobey found that federal prosecutions ac-
counted for 18.9 percent of all weapons convictions, 11.3 percent of
all drug-trafficking convictions, and less than 1 percent of sexual
assault convictions.425
In 2015, federal prosecutors brought 116 charges of sexual abuse
of adults and 804 charges of sexual abuse of minors.426 The number
for marijuana possession was 2487; for marijuana distribution,
2861; and for firearms “Possession by Prohibited Persons,” 4317.427
The chart below conveys a visual impression of these statistics. I
have aggregated marijuana possession and distribution as well as
sexual abuse of minors and of adults.428
422. See Tuerkheimer, supra note 121, at 1294-95 (discussing the pattern of state police
not processing rape complaints).
423. Susan R. Klein & Ingrid B. Grobey, Debunking Claims of Over-Federalization of
Criminal Law, 62 EMORY L.J. 1, 18 (2012). 
424. See id. at 18-19.
425. Id.
426. See ADMIN. OFFICE U.S. COURTS, supra note 399.
427. Id. 
428. There is a more recent report from the Administrative Office of the United States
Courts, but it does not discriminate among types of firearms or sexual offenses. See ADMIN.
OFFICE U.S. COURTS, supra note 404. 
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Figure 2. Number of Charges Brought by Federal Prosecutors for
Various Offenses in 2015
Granting the need for some enforcement of possessory offenses,
the question is how much enforcement is appropriate given com-
peting alternatives. The issue is not legalization, but prioritization.
As a group of former U.S. Attorneys wrote to the Attorney General,
protesting the recent (and short-lived) policy of prosecuting all
illegal entry cases, “there are only a finite number of federal pros-
ecutors to address the broad swath of dangerous and illegal activity
that takes place in our country.”429 Assets committed to one type of
case are unavailable in other types.430 Surely the investigation and
prosecution of the most meritorious rape cases deserves priority
over pursuing the least meritorious cases of proxy crimes.
429. Letter from Alan Bersin et al., Former U.S. Attorneys, to Jefferson B. Sessions,
Attorney Gen. (June 18, 2018), https://medium.com/@formerusattorneys/bipartisan-group-of-
former-united-states-attorneys-call-on-sessions-to-end-child-detention-e129ae0df0cf [https://
perma.cc/PE8F-64TU].
430. See, e.g., id.
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D. Two Proposals
1. The Simple Proposal
Appendix I offers model statutory language for a general federal
rape statute. The jurisdictional language is taken from the Hobbs
Act,431 and the substantive provisions are taken from the federal
forcible sexual assault statute respecting adult victims, criminal
code § 2241(a) and (b).432 This statute would simply track the Hobbs
Act and leave enforcement to the discretion of the FBI, the U.S.
Attorney’s Offices, and the Criminal Division of the DOJ.433
Different U.S. Attorney’s Offices might have different views of the
model statute. Some might be impressed enough by the crime
control benefits of prosecuting serial rapists, relative to retail drug
dealers,434 to bring many rape prosecutions based on investigations
by federal agents.435 Others might be less enthusiastic, for the same
reasons that state law enforcement officials are often reluctant to
deal with rape cases.436 Still others might see political opportunity
in becoming known as a successful rape prosecutor.437
Even federal offices reluctant to bring their own rape prosecutions
would face some pressure to investigate possible federal charges
against accused rapists when the state prosecutors either declined
to proceed or lost a dubious jury verdict at trial.438 This backstop-
ping function should not be underestimated. The state authorities
would screen cases knowing that the complainants they turn away
431. See 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (2012).
432. See id. § 2241(a)-(b). 18 U.S.C. § 2241(c) deals with sexual abuse of children under
twelve and ages twelve to sixteen. Id. § 2241(c). Consistent with this Article’s focus on
improving enforcement of forcible sexual assault, those provisions are omitted from the model
statute. Any forcible sexual abuse of victims, of any age, is covered by the proposed language. 
433. See 9-131.000—The Hobbs Act—18 U.S.C. § 1951, U.S. DEP’T JUST., https://www.
justice.gov/jm/jm-9-131000-hobbs-act-18-usc-1951 [https://perma.cc/YFB7-TBMY] (last up-
dated May 2011).
434. See supra notes 409-11 and accompanying text.
435. The drain on the FBI would be less than the drain on U.S. Attorney’s Offices because
many rape cases could be prosecuted based on investigations by local police. 
436. See supra Part I.B.2-3; supra notes 123-26 and accompanying text.
437. See Kenneth J. Melilli, Prosecutorial Discretion in an Adversary System, 1992 BYU
L. REV. 669, 670, 673, 688.
438. See supra notes 364-65 and accompanying text.
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have another place to seek redress, with attendant publicity if the
federal authorities indict.439
The state authorities would also know that even if they lost a
trial, there would be a significant chance that a successive federal
prosecution would succeed, at least so long as the Court continues
to approve the dual-sovereignty doctrine440 that permits successive
prosecutions of identically defined offenses, and as long as the
cases are brought by prosecutors representing different govern-
ments, whether state or federal, without collusion.441 Collateral
estoppel applies to successive prosecutions involving the same par-
ties and thus does not apply to charges brought by separate sov-
ereigns.442
The DOJ’s “Petite Policy” addresses federalism concerns by im-
posing special limits on follow-on federal prosecutions.443 Sub-
stantively, in addition to the normal requirement that the charge be
provable, the policy requires that the case “involve a substantial
federal interest” that the prior proceedings left “demonstrably
unvindicated.”444 Procedurally, the policy requires approval by an
Assistant Attorney General at main Justice before a U.S. Attorney’s
Office may proceed.445
There is more bark than bite to the Petite Policy. It does require
a considered judgment about federalism interests, but it does not
impose practical limits on successive federal prosecutions.446 The
439. See supra notes 376-77 and accompanying text.
440. See supra notes 378-79 and accompanying text (discussing Gamble v. United States,
now pending in the Supreme Court).
441. See, e.g., Puerto Rico v. Sanchez Valle, 136 S. Ct. 1863, 1870 (2016) (“[T]wo
prosecutions, this Court has long held, are not for the same offense if brought by different
sovereigns—even when those actions target the identical criminal conduct through equivalent
criminal laws.”).
442. See, e.g., United States v. Angleton, 314 F.3d 767, 776 (5th Cir. 2002) (holding that the
double-jeopardy estoppel doctrine of Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436 (1970) “is inapplicable
here, because the United States and Texas, as separate sovereigns, are not the ‘same party.’”).
This focus on identity of parties implies that even if Gamble holds that sovereignty is not an
element that can distinguish federal from state offenses with identical elements, the separate-
sovereigns doctrine is an essential component of the estoppel doctrine announced in Ashe.
443. See 9-2.031-Dual and Successive Prosecution Policy (“Petite Policy”), U.S. DEP’T JUST.
[hereinafter Petite Policy], https://www.justice.gov/jm/jm-9-2000-authority-us-attorney-crimi
nal-division-mattersprior-approvals#9-2.031 [https://perma.cc/YS2A-JGJ9].
444. Id.
445. Id.
446. See id.
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cases unanimously hold that defendants may not raise violations of
the policy as a defense.447 Some of the decisions intimate the view
that prosecution of serious federal crimes, as such, constitutes a
“substantial federal interest.”448
The policy has a somewhat circular quality because it makes
current DOJ enforcement priorities one gauge of the federal
interest.449 The Petite Policy has not prevented successive federal
prosecutions for common drug and firearms offenses.450 The
“substantial federal interest” in these cases arises either from the
dangerousness of the offense or from the aggregate effect on inter-
state commerce from crimes of this type.451 Either way, rape pros-
ecutions serve these interests at least as much as drug or gun cases.
There is harm done to the victim in every rape case,452 and the
aggregate economic effect of sexual assault is massive.453 There is
447. See Jean F. Rydstrom, Annotation, Effect on Federal Criminal Prosecution or
Conviction of Prosecutor's Noncompliance with Petite Policy Requiring Prior Authorization of
Attorney General for Federal Trial Where Accused Has Been Previously Prosecuted for Same
Acts in State Court, 51 AM. L. REP. FED. 852 § 2[a] (1981).
448. See United States v. Stokes, 124 F.3d 39, 45 (1st Cir. 1997) (“The record indicates that
Stokes is a dangerous criminal, and the federal government had a perfect right to take a hard
look at his case and to determine whether society’s interests call for the unusual step of
instituting a federal prosecution notwithstanding the prior commencement of a state
prosecution for substantially the same conduct.”); United States v. Basile, 109 F.3d 1304, 1307
(8th Cir. 1997) (“The independence and importance of the federal interest in protecting the
channels of interstate commerce from the taint of crime is unaffected by DeCaro’s previous
acquittal in state court; it remains just as important and worthy of vindication after the state
trial as it was before.”); id. at 1308 (“We are not convinced that the federal prosecution in this
case failed to meet the ‘compelling interests’ requirement of the Petite policy. We need not and
do not decide the question, however, because the Petite policy is ‘not constitutionally
mandated.’”).
449. See Petite Policy, supra note 443 (“Matters that come within the national investigative
or prosecutorial priorities established by the Department are more likely than others to
satisfy this requirement.”).
450. See, e.g., United States v. Tirrell, 120 F.3d 670, 676-77 (7th Cir. 1997) (allowing
federal prosecution for Tirrell’s firearms offenses); United States v. Caldwell, 816 F. Supp.
657, 658 (D. Kan. 1993) (permitting a subsequent federal prosecution for use of firearm in
drug trafficking offenses). 
451. See, e.g., United States v. Harris, 87 F. App’x 782, 784 (2d Cir. 2004); United States
v. Claiborne, 92 F. Supp. 2d 503, 512 (E.D. Va. 2000).
452. See Effects of Sexual Violence, supra note 409.
453. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 633-34 (2000) (Souter, J., dissenting)
(summarizing congressional findings); id. at 635-36 (“[G]ender-based violence in the 1990[ ]s
was shown to operate in a manner similar to racial discrimination in the 1960[ ]s in reducing
the mobility of employees and their production and consumption of goods shipped in interstate
commerce.”).
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more reason to doubt the effectiveness of state enforcement of the
sexual assault laws than of the narcotics and firearms laws.454 The
Petite Policy, even unamended, would not stand in the way of
successive federal rape prosecutions.455
If federal prosecutors picked up the case and won, the state
prosecutors could claim victory (with some justification, given the
advantages of trying a rape case after knowing the defendant’s
testimony at a prior trial).456 If the U.S. Attorney’s Office filed a
follow-on indictment and lost, the state prosecutors could defend
both their decision to try the case and their failure to win a
conviction by pointing out that the federal authorities also thought
it was a righteous case, and also lost a trial.
The proposal comes with no guarantee that resources devoted to
rape would come from the dubious fringe of enforcing proxy
crimes.457 That is the logical place from which to draw them,
especially if main Justice made clear that success rates in rape
cases would be measured more generously than for possessory
offenses. Even if rape cases competed with fraud cases, the former
seem more serious than the latter. Many fraud cases can be
prosecuted by the states,458 and many more can be remedied by
private law suits, including qui tam suits on behalf of the govern-
ment.459
The proposed legislation does not include a section analogous to
18 U.S.C. § 2244(b), criminalizing unconsented sex even without use
of force by the defendant.460 An intense debate continues over
454. See supra Part I.B.
455. See Petite Policy, supra note 443.
456. See supra note 369 and accompanying text.
457. See supra Part III.B.
458. In 2006, nearly 85 percent of felony fraud convictions occurred at the state level. See
ROSENMERKEL ET AL., supra note 413, at 9 tbl.1.6.
459. See 932. Provisions for the Handling of Qui Tam Suits Filed Under the False Claims
Act, U.S. DEP’T JUST., https://www.justice.gov/jm/criminal-resource-manual-932-provisions-
handling-qui-tam-suits-filed-under-false-claims-act [https://perma.cc/D2DJ-AEGS].
460. 18 U.S.C. § 2244(b) (2012) provides:
Whoever, in the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States
or in a Federal prison, or in any prison, institution, or facility in which persons
are held in custody by direction of or pursuant to a contract or agreement with
the head of any Federal department or agency, knowingly engages in sexual
contact with another person without that other person’s permission shall be
fined under this title, imprisoned not more than two years, or both.
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affirmative consent statutes.461 Adoption of a federal affirmative
consent statute premised on the Commerce Clause would signifi-
cantly increase the amount of conduct that violates the criminal law
in many states.462
Adding federal resources to the prosecution of offenses that are
universally condemned is a lesser intrusion into traditional state
authority than creating new liabilities in the territory of states that
have thus far refused to extend the criminal law so far. If a national
political consensus comes to support the affirmative consent stan-
dard, Congress can incorporate that standard into national law.
Until then, the controversy over novel expansions of rape law should
not be allowed to stand in the way of effective enforcement of sexual
assault as traditionally defined. As the law in this area evolves, and
if the proposed federal forcible rape statute proves a success,
Congress could revisit the no-force, no-consent cases.
For similar reasons, current federal law’s child-abuse and
statutory rape provisions are not included. These cases present no
issue of consent in the state courts.463 A federal law would overlay
a uniform national standard on the age of consent.464 That would be
an overreach for reforms directed at improving prosecutions of
forcible rape.465 If there is evidence of systematic nonenforcement
in the states, Congress could consider sexual assault legislation
specific to minors at some future time. It should be noted that the
proposed legislation includes no exception for young victims.466
Forced sex would still be sexual abuse, subject to severe penalties.
2. The More Ambitious Proposal
If we accept the premise that for the foreseeable future the fed-
eral government will have a substantial role in enforcing ordinary
461. See, e.g., supra note 169 (discussing debate in the ALI over proposed affirmative-
consent standard).
462. See supra Part II.B.
463. See Sandra Norman-Eady et al., Statutory Rape Laws by State, CONN. GEN. ASSEMBLY
(April 14, 2003), https://www.cga.ct.gov/2003/olrdata/jud/rpt/2003-R-0376.htm [https://perma.
cc/EPW4-UGZ7].
464. See id. (stating that the age of consent varies by state).
465. See id. (stating that force is not an element in statutory rape cases).
466. See infra Appendix I.
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criminal law, reorienting federal law away from possessory offenses
that badly predict future violence467 in favor of prosecuting violent
crimes as such is an urgent project indeed. The simple federal rape
statute modeled on the Hobbs Act would take a small step down this
road because Congress could pass that statute without appropriat-
ing any funds. Whatever use U.S. Attorneys made of the statute
would improve law enforcement’s response to sexual assault,
simultaneously consuming federal resources that would otherwise
go to proxy crimes.468
The project of rationalizing federal criminal law, however, invites
a more far-reaching proposal. Immigration and Customs Enforce-
ment is now in the DHS,469 so the DOJ includes three major inves-
tigative services: the FBI, DEA, and ATF.470 It seems odd having
two whole bureaus, employing thousands of brave and resourceful
agents, and spending billions of dollars, on the enforcement of proxy
crimes.471 At least this seems strange when we remember that FBI
has responsibility for such things as the Hobbs Act,472 the Federal
Kidnapping Act,473 and the murder-for-hire statute.474 Those crimes
of violence justifiably take a back seat in an agency tasked with
counterterrorism, counterintelligence, and investigating interstate
and international fraud.475
The story of the DEA is instructive. President Nixon, after
extensive congressional hearings, created the DEA by executive
order out of resources already up and running inside the DOJ.476
467. See, e.g., supra notes 393-96 and accompanying text.
468. See supra Part III.B.
469. Organizational Chart, U.S. DEP’T HOMELAND SECURITY (May 19, 2018), https://www.
dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/18_0519_DHS_Organizational_Chart.pdf [https://
perma.cc/F2U4-QHL5].
470. Organizational Chart, U.S. DEP’T JUSTICE (Feb. 5, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/
agencies/chart [https://perma.cc/K284-7T6F].
471. See Fact Sheet—Staffing and Budget, BUREAU ALCOHOL, TOBACCO, FIREARMS &
EXPLOSIVES (May 2018), https://www.atf.gov/resource-center/fact-sheet/fact-sheet-staffing-
and-budget [https://perma.cc/SG2P-NAF9]; Who We Are, U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENFORCE-
MENT, https://www.ice.gov/about [https://perma.cc/XE86-UDFR] (last updated Aug. 24, 2018);
supra Part III.B. (discussing proxy crimes the bureaus prosecute and suggesting a greater
focus on rape prosecutions).
472. 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (2012).
473. Id. § 1201(a).
474. Id. §1958.
475. See What We Investigate, supra note 382.
476. See DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMIN., THE DEA YEARS, https://www.dea.gov/sites/default/
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While different theories of bureaucratic behavior attribute different
goals to agency leaders, obtaining budget increases is a common
goal.477 Research on bureaucratic behavior predicts that one aim of
an agency will be expansion.478 The DEA was no exception. In 1973,
DEA had 1470 special agents and a budget of less than $75 million;
as of 2017, the DEA had 5004 special agents and a budget of $2.916
billion.479
If the government can devote huge bureaucracies to enforcing
proxy crimes, the government can afford to create a bureau inside
the DOJ dedicated to enforcing crimes against persons that are
punishable under federal law—a Federal Bureau of Violent Crimes,
or BVC. Before resigning, Attorney General Jefferson Sessions
issued a memorandum to U.S. Attorneys that, unintentionally,
makes a powerful case for such a bureau.480 The memorandum’s
subject heading is “Commitment to Targeting Violent Crime” and
began by stating that “[i]t is the policy of the Department of Justice
to reduce crime in America, and addressing violent crime must be
a special priority.”481
The memorandum went on to suggest that federal prosecutors
consider bringing charges under federal laws against violent crimes,
such as the Hobbs Act.482 The memo followed this sensible sugges-
tion with a more ominous message:
Of course, federal prosecutors are not limited to using only these
tools, and, in fact, statutes targeting other criminal acts may be
equally effective. For example, many violent crimes are driven
files/2018-07/1970-1975%20p%2030-39.pdf [https://perma.cc/7FX8-FRAH]. Congress subse-
quently ratified the Executive Order. See Reorganization Plan No. 2 of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-
253, reprinted in 5 U.S.C. app. 2 (Supp. III 1970) (includes text of the order).
477. See Jennifer Nou, Intra-Agency Coordination, 129 HARV. L. REV. 421, 435 (2015).
478. See, e.g., id. (“Prominent theories posit that agency heads attempt to maximize their
operating budgets, institutional reputations, or future career prospects. In reality, agency
heads are likely to have complex utility functions that take into account many, if not all, of
these considerations.” (footnotes omitted)).
479. See Staffing and Budget, DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMIN., https://www.dea.gov/ staffing-
and-budget [https://perma.cc/37JC-E44J].
480. Memorandum from Attorney General Jefferson Sessions, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to All
Federal Prosecutors (Mar. 8, 2017) (available at https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/
946771/download [https://perma.cc/WS5H-H5GE]).
481. Id. at 1.
482. Id. at 1-2.
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by drug trafficking and drug trafficking organizations. For this
reason, disrupting and dismantling those drug organizations
through prosecutions under the [CSA] can drive violent crime
down.483
The former Attorney General’s commitment to devoting federal
assets to reducing violent crime is well taken. The suggestion of a
renewed emphasis on proxy crimes promises a return to the policies
that led to mass incarceration.484 A bureau devoted to punishing
violent criminals for violent crimes would do much to limit the
damage threatened by those policies.485
The proposed federal rape statute would be only one of many
federal statutes that make violent crime a federal matter. Congress
could create a new bureau dedicated to enforcing these statutes by
taking a bite out of the DEA and ATF.486 It would thereafter
compete for scarce funds by pleading, with considerable justice, that
violent criminals deserve priority over possessory offenders and
require more resources to detect and convict.487 Appendix II offers
language based on the executive order creating DEA and provisions
of the CSA authorizing DEA investigations and use of force.
IV. REPLIES TO OBJECTIONS
A. Theoretical Purity: Federalism
Constitutional originalists and advocates of state sovereignty
might receive my proposals with suspicion, hostility, or even horror.
To be clear, I am not proposing spending any more money on federal
law enforcement. I am proposing reallocating federal prosecutors,
agents, and prison space away from possessory crimes and toward
violent crimes. What would change is not the size, but the content,
of the federal criminal docket.
483. Id. at 2.
484. See supra notes 29-30 and accompanying text. Neither the departure of Mr. Sessions
nor the adoption of the aptly-named First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-391, 132 Stat.
5194, suggests a diminished commitment to prosecuting proxy crimes.
485. See supra Part III.B.
486. See infra Appendix II.
487. See supra Part III.B.
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Consider this hypothetical case. Defendant, with a felony record,
abducts V at gunpoint, rapes her, and steals her cash and credit
cards. The gun possession is a federal crime under § 922(g),488 the
kidnapping is a federal crime under the Federal Kidnapping Act
(because the gun is an instrumentality of commerce),489 and the
theft-by-force is a federal crime under the Hobbs Act.490 Is it really
the case that making the rape—the worst of these offenses—a
federal crime would be the straw that breaks the camel’s back, some
unique and catastrophic step toward a congressional police power?
It may be that reorienting federal criminal law toward violent
crimes might make federal criminal law generally more durable.491
This argument, however, supposes realistic prospects for curtail-
ing federal criminal jurisdiction while admitting that, if federal
criminal law is here to stay, it will be better addressed toward vi-
olence than to contraband.492 Federal law now overlaps state law for
nearly all robbery, nearly all arson, any murder-for-hire, and any
murder or assault by gunfire in the course of drug trafficking.493
There is no political pressure to repeal any of these measures.494 The
continued expansion of federal criminal law (for example, carjacking
and its enforcement, or drugs since the Lopez decision) discredits
any prediction of a general curtailment, whether led by Congress or
the courts.495
Block grants to the state authorities might improve rape enforce-
ment,496 but this would also increase the net prison population
488. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (2012).
489. See id. § 1201(a)(1).
490. See id. § 1951.
491. Many are generally opposed to the increased federalization of crime. See Nora V.
Demleitner, The Federalization of Crime and Sentencing, 11 FED. SENT’G REP. 123 (1998)
(outlining a variety of concerns associated with such federalization).
492. See supra Part III.B.
493. See Klein & Grobey, supra note 423, at 11-12; Adam H. Kurland, First Principles of
American Federalism and the Nature of Federal Criminal Jurisdiction, 45 EMORY L.J. 1, 2
(1996).
494. See Klein & Grobey, supra note 423, at 2-3 (suggesting that politicians are willing to
“mak[e] a federal case out of any conceivable bad behavior” and seek to avoid appearing “soft
on crime”).
495. See id. at 11-12.
496. See Nadine M. Neufville, Measuring the Effectiveness of Grants, U.S. DEP’T JUST. (Feb.
10, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/ovw/blog/measuring-effectiveness-grants [https://perma.cc/
XV4R-BZMC].
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without reducing the number of prosecutions for possessory crimes.
One reason Congress so often enacts new criminal laws is that no
appropriations are required.497 The criticisms of adopting a federal
rape statute, without any further spending, are that enforcing the
rape statute would draw resources from the dubious fringes of
enforcing contraband crimes.498
B. Theoretical Purity: Feminism
Some feminists might question either the Commerce Clause
predicate or the focus on autonomy rather than equality.499 Reliance
on the Commerce Clause might suggest commodification, but only
to those who focus on jurisdiction and ignore content.500 The Civil
Rights Act is based on the Commerce Clause.501 Any implication of
commodification from the jurisdictional predicate logically but
implausibly impugns Title VII.
Rape violates the autonomy of all its victims, and the great
majority of those victims are women.502 We can therefore under-
stand rape as a crime of violence and a crime of domination.503
Addressing rape as a crime of violence, as proposed, neither denies
the role of rape in larger patterns of inequality nor precludes other
legislation premised on an equality conception. I would regard a
proposal to add the Thirteenth Amendment as an additional source
of Congressional jurisdiction as a friendly amendment.504 However,
497. See Paul J. Larkin, Jr., Public Choice Theory and Overcriminalization, 36 HARV. J.L.
& PUB. POL’Y 715, 736 (2013).
498. See supra Part III.D.2.
499. See Judith Resnik, Categorical Federalism: Jurisdiction, Gender, and the Globe, 111
YALE L.J. 619, 631-33 (2001) (discussing this view but rejecting it).
500. See id.
501. See Nicole Huberfeld, The Commerce Clause Post-Lopez: It’s Not Dead Yet, 28 SETON
HALL L. REV. 182, 183 (1997).
502. See, e.g, MICHELE BLACK ET AL., NAT’L INTIMATE PARTNER & SEXUAL VIOLENCE SURV.,
2010 SUMMARY REPORT 18 (2011), https://www.cdc.gov/violenceprevention/pdf/nisvs_report
2010-a.pdf [https://perma.cc/4VAJ-U43P] (reporting that for women the lifetime prevalence
of rape was one in five, and for men one in seventy-one).
503. See Aya Gruber, Rape, Feminism, and the War on Crime, 84 WASH. L. REV. 581, 592
(2009).
504. See Kim, supra note 185, at 289 (arguing that Congress could have rape jurisdiction
under the Thirteenth Amendment); supra notes 199-201 and accompanying text.
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I prefer the Commerce Clause because I want to win in the courts.505
Regardless, there is no incompatibility here.
C. Theoretical Purity—Procedural Fairness
Civil libertarians may object to wider use of the dual-sovereigns
doctrine or admissibility of prior crimes evidence to show propen-
sity. If the dual-sovereignty doctrine is here to stay, there seems no
reason not to use it against rapists as compared to, say, arsonists.506
There are powerful objections to the relevance and potential
prejudice of propensity evidence in sexual assault cases.507 Admissi-
bility can be justified as an antidote to rape myths.508 Fighting one
prejudice with another is at least plausible. If, however, one thought
it was desirable and practical to except prosecutions under the new
statutes from the scope of Federal Rule of Evidence 413 (or at least
to require prior convictions rather than permit mini-trials on alle-
gations of past acts), I would have no objection.
D. State Retrenchment
One might object that committing federal resources to rape
enforcement would encourage the states to move assets from sex
offenses to other priorities.509 There are good reasons to doubt this
would happen.510 First, changes in state priorities could not be kept
secret, and adverse publicity would attend to any overt retrench-
ment. Second, the federal authorities have a Missoula-type civil
suit at their disposal.511 State authorities who cut back on rape
505. See supra notes 202-05 and accompanying text.
506. See United States v. Coker, 433 F.3d 39, 47 (1st Cir. 2005) (holding that in a federal
arson prosecution the right to counsel on the federal charge did not attach when state charges
based on the same conduct were filed).
507. See Jeffrey Waller, Comment, Federal Rules of Evidence 413-415: “Laws are Like
Medicine: They Generally Cure an Evil by a Lesser ... Evil,” 30 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 1503, 1510,
1524, 1530 (1999).
508. See supra notes 25-28 and accompanying text.
509. See Mark D. Rosen, The New Governancism?, 59 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1079, 1095 (2015)
(suggesting that federal-state overlap could lead to “unhealthy dynamics”).
510. See id. at 1101-02 (suggesting that concerns about federal-state overlap are likely
overblown).
511. Cf. supra notes 193-94 and accompanying text.
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enforcement might face public awareness of an investigation by the
DOJ and actual litigation if the investigation was not resolved to
federal satisfaction.512 
Finally, while it might be plausible to imagine state prosecutors
referring more rape cases to their federal counterparts, the other
side of that coin is that local police would realize that some cases
state prosecutors hitherto would have declined could now be suc-
cessfully prosecuted.513 The flow of rape cases to state prosecutors
would probably go up, offsetting any speculative decrease in priority
by state prosecutors.
CONCLUSION: A WINDOW OF OPPORTUNITY
The wave of accusations against celebrities has created a new
political climate, one that offers a chance to take action against the
seemingly permanent crisis of sexual assault.514 Members of
Congress face the same change in public opinion.
What action can Congress take? There can be little doubt that the
commerce power reaches at least some, and probably many, sexual
assaults. The proposed federal rape offense would not be accompa-
nied by new expenditures, but rather it would add resources for the
prosecution of rape cases by drawing them away from cases of proxy
crimes. One broad consensus agrees that the states are underenforc-
ing rape, and another agrees that the federal government is
overenforcing possessory offenses. The Constitution, then, permits
what common sense requires. Congress should make rape a federal
crime.
512. Cf. supra notes 193-94 and accompanying text.
513. See supra Part III.A.2.
514. See Vicki Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment, Again, 128 YALE L.J.F. 22,
23-26 (2018).
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APPENDIX I: A PROPOSED FEDERAL SEXUAL ASSAULT ACT OF 2018
18 U.S.C. § 00000 Findings and Definitions
(a) Definitions: As used in this Act,
(1) “The term ‘commerce’ means commerce within the District of
Columbia, or any Territory or Possession of the United States; all
commerce between any point in a State, Territory, Possession, or the
District of Columbia and any point outside thereof; all commerce
between points within the same State through any place outside
such State; and all other commerce over which the United States
has jurisdiction.”515
(2) “[T]he term ‘sexual act’ means—”516
(A) “contact between the penis and the vulva or the penis and
the anus, and for purposes of this subparagraph contact involving
the penis occurs upon penetration, however slight”;517
(B) “contact between the mouth and the penis, the mouth and
the vulva, or the mouth and the anus”;518
(C) “the penetration, however slight, of the anal or genital
opening of another by a hand or finger or by any object, with an
intent to abuse, humiliate, harass, degrade, or arouse or gratify the
sexual desire of any person; or”519
(3) “[T]he term ‘sexual contact’ means the intentional touching,
either directly or through the clothing, of the genitalia, anus, groin,
breast, inner thigh, or buttocks of any person with an intent to
abuse, humiliate, harass, degrade, or arouse or gratify the sexual
desire of any person”;520
(b) Findings: The Congress finds that—
(1) A baby girl born in the United States has a one in five chance
of being raped in her lifetime;521
515. 18 U.S.C. § 1951(b)(3) (2012).
516. Id. § 2246(2).
517. Id. § 2246(2)(A).
518. Id. § 2246(2)(B).
519. Id. § 2246(2)(C).
520. Id. § 2246(3).
521. Get Statistics, NAT’L SEXUAL VIOLENCE RESOURCE CTR., https://www.nsvrc.org/
statistics [https://perma.cc/Q45X-3R56].
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(2) Despite commendable reform efforts at the state level, rape
remains the most underreported and underenforced violent crime;522
(3) Many rapists exploit facilities of interstate commerce, in-
cluding telephones, cellular phones, and the Internet, to commit
their crimes;523
(4) Many rapists employ instrumentalities of commerce to commit
their crimes, including weapons and condoms passed through
interstate commerce;524
(5) Sexual assault at the workplace has a substantial effect on
interstate commerce;525
(6) Sexual assault on commercial sex workers has a substantial
effect on interstate commerce;526
(7) Sexual assault committed with date-rape drugs has a substan-
tial effect on interstate commerce.527
18 U.S.C. § 00001 Aggravated Sexual Abuse in or Affecting Inter-
state or Foreign Commerce 
(a) “Whoever in any way or degree obstructs, delays, or affects
commerce or the movement of any [person,] article or commodity in
commerce, by”528 “knowingly caus[ing] another person to engage in
a sexual act—”529
(1) “by using force against that other person; or”530
(2) “by threatening or placing that other person in fear that any
person will be subjected to death, serious bodily injury, or kidnap-
ping; or attempts to do so, shall be fined under this title, imprisoned
for any term of years or life, or both.”531
(b) “BY OTHER MEANS.—”532
522. Id.
523. See, e.g., Lee, supra note 291; Martin, supra note 291; McMillan, supra note 291.
524. See supra notes 311-16 and accompanying text.
525. See supra Part II.B.4.a.
526. See supra Part II.B.4.b.
527. See supra Part II.B.4.c.
528. 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a) (2012).
529. Id. § 2241(a).
530. Id. § 2241(a)(1).
531. Id. § 2241(a)(2).
532. Id. § 2241(b).
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“Whoever in any way or degree obstructs, delays, or affects com-
merce or the movement of any article or commodity in commerce,
[by knowingly—]”533
(1) “[R]endering [another] person unconscious [and thereby
engages in a sexual act with that other person]; or”534
(2) “administering to [another] person by force or threat of force,
or without the knowledge or [permission] of that person, a drug,
intoxicant, or other similar substance and thereby[—]”
(A) “substantially impair[s] the ability of that other person to
appraise or control conduct; [and]”535
(B) “engages in a sexual act with that other person; or attempts
to do so, shall be fined under this title, imprisoned for any term of
years or life, or both.”536
18 U.S.C. § 00002 Sexual Abuse in or Affecting Interstate or Foreign
Commerce
(a) “Whoever in any way or degree obstructs, delays, or affects
commerce or the movement of any [person,] article or commodity in
commerce,”537
(1) by “knowingly caus[ing] another person to engage in a sexual
act”538 “by threatening or placing that other person in fear that any
person will be subjected to death, serious bodily injury, or kidnap-
ping”;539 or
(2) “engages in a sexual act with another person if that other
person is—”540
(A) “incapable of appraising the nature of the conduct; or”541
(B) “physically incapable of declining participation in, or
communicating unwillingness to engage in, that sexual act; or
attempts to do so, shall be fined under this title and imprisoned for
any term of years or for life.”542
533. Id. § 1951(a).
534. 10 U.S.C. § 920(a)(4).
535. Id. § 920(a)(5).
536. 18 U.S.C. § 2241(b)(2)(B).
537. Id. § 1951(a).
538. Id. § 2241(a).
539. Id. § 2241(a)(2).
540. Id. § 2242(2).
541. Id. § 2242(2)(A).
542. Id. § 2242(2)(B).
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Proposed 18 U.S.C. § 00003 Sexually Abusive Contact in or
Affecting Interstate or Foreign Commerce
“Whoever in any way or degree obstructs, delays, or affects com-
merce or the movement of any [person,] article or commodity in
commerce, by”543 knowingly engaging in or causing sexual contact
with or by another person, if so doing would violate—
(a) subsection (a) or (b) of section 00001 of this act had the sexual
contact been a sexual act, shall be fined under this title, imprisoned
not more than ten years, or both;
(b) section 00002 of this Act had the sexual contact been a sexual
act, shall be fined under this title, imprisoned not more than three
years, or both.
543. Id. § 1951(a).
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APPENDIX II: AN ACT TO CREATE A BUREAU OF VIOLENT CRIMES IN
THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
§ 1 Bureau of Violent Crimes. “There is established in the Depart-
ment of Justice an agency which shall be known as the [Bureau of
Violent Crimes], hereinafter referred to as ‘the [Bureau].’”544
§ 2 Officers of the Bureau.
(a) “There shall be at the head of the [Bureau the Director of the
Bureau of Violent Crimes], hereinafter referred to as [“the Direc-
tor.”] The [Director] shall be appointed by the President by and with
the advice and consent of the Senate, and shall receive compensa-
tion at the rate now or hereafter prescribed by law for positions of
level III of the Executive Schedule Pay Rates (5 U.S.C. 5314). He
shall perform such functions as the Attorney General shall from
time to time direct.”545
(b) “There shall be in the [Bureau] a Deputy [Director of the
Bureau], hereinafter referred to as ‘the Deputy [Director],’ who shall
be appointed by the President by and with the advice and consent
of the Senate, shall perform such functions as the Attorney General
may from time to time direct, and shall receive compensation at the
rate now or hereafter prescribed by law for positions of level V of the
Executive Schedule Pay Rates (5 U.S.C. 5316).”546
(c) “The Deputy [Director] or such other official of the Department
of Justice as the Attorney General shall from time to time designate
shall act as [Director] during the absence or disability of the
[Director] or in the event of a vacancy in the office of [Director].”547
§ 3 Mission and authority. The Bureau may investigate any violent
crime against the United States, including 18 U.S.C. § 1958 (murder
for hire), 28 U.S.C. § 540B (assisting state authorities in investigat-
ing serial killing), 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) & (h) (firearm in furtherance
of crime of violence, exclusive of drug trafficking; additional
penalties if death results); 18 U.S.C. § 1201 (kidnapping), 18 U.S.C.
544. Reorganization Plan No. 2 of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-253, reprinted in 5 U.S.C. app. 2
(Supp. III 1970).
545. Id.
546. Id.
547. Id.
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§ 1951 (Hobbs Act), any crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 1952
(Travel Act), 18 U.S.C. § 844(f) (arson of property belonging to the
United States or any organization receiving federal financial
support), 18 U.S.C. § 2119 (carjacking) and the Federal Sexual
Assault Act of 2018.
§ 4. Coordination. “The Attorney General, acting through the [Di-
rector] and such other officials of the Department of Justice as he
may designate, shall provide for the coordination of all [enforcement
of crimes of violence] vested in the Attorney General so as to assure
maximum cooperation between and among the [Bureau], the Fed-
eral Bureau of Investigation, and other units of the Department
involved in the performance of these and related functions.”548
§ 5. Powers of enforcement personnel.
“(a) Any officer or employee of the [Bureau] or any State ... or
local law enforcement officer designated by the Attorney General
may—
(1) carry firearms; (2) execute and serve search warrants, arrest
warrants, administrative inspection warrants, subpoenas, and
summonses issued under the authority of the United States; (3)
make arrests without warrant (A) for any offense against the
United States committed in his presence, or (B) for any felony,
cognizable under the laws of the United States, if he has
probable cause to believe that the person to be arrested has
committed or is committing a felony;(4) make seizures of
property pursuant to the provisions of this subchapter; and (5)
perform such other law enforcement duties as the Attorney
General may designate.
(b) State and local law enforcement officers performing functions
under this section shall not be deemed Federal employees and
shall not be subject to provisions of law relating to Federal
employees, except that such officers shall be subject to section
3374(c) of title 5.”549
548. Id.
549. 21 U.S.C. § 878 (2012).
